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LIBERALISM
AT A
CROSSROADS

Nearly every one of the promises that were made by
the architects and creators of liberalism has been shattered. The liberal state expands to control nearly every
aspect of life while citizens regard government as a distant and uncontrollable power, one that only extends
their sense of powerlessness by relentlessly advancing
the project of ‘globalization.’ The only rights that seem
secure today belong to those with sufficient wealth
and position to protect them, and their autonomy … is
increasingly compromised by legal intent or technological fait accompli.

But the solution isn’t more liberalism, institutional tinkering, or reforms to our political system, Deneen says. Our
present problems don’t stem from a failure to live up to
liberal ideals. Rather, in some strange dialectic, liberalism “has failed because it has succeeded”—its disastrous
effects spring from its central ideology. They are the
system’s features, not its bugs. “To call for the cures of
liberalism’s ills by applying more liberal measures,” he
argues, “is tantamount to throwing gas on a raging fire.”

WHAT DENEEN SETS OUT TO ARGUE is that the political philosophy underlying American politics is utterly bankrupt.
This diagnosis, and most importantly its timing, is why
the book has received such broad attention. Very little
is truly new here, and Deneen mainly rehashes critiques
that Catholic conservatives have offered for decades,
perhaps most notably in Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue.
Even so, Why Liberalism Failed offers a bold critique
of contemporary American society and the ideas that
underpin it.

TWO TRUTHS EXIST IN UNEASY TENSION: liberalism has triumphed over its opponents, and liberalism is in mortal
decay. Under the first, we inhabit the so-called “end of
history,” where liberalism—with its focus on the rights and
freedoms of the individual—has felled its main competitors, communism and fascism. Look around the world
and we see liberal regimes, justified in liberal terms. Pax
Liberalis, thy kingdom hath come.
Under the second, liberalism’s fate hangs in the balance.
The resurgence of illiberalism across Europe points to
a profound unease with the status quo. In America, a
political revolt against liberal elites yielded Donald J.
Trump. Defenders of liberalism find themselves forced
to acknowledge the disenchantment of the “other half,”
those disadvantaged by neoliberal economics and
regarded contemptuously by the cultural elite of the coasts.
Bellum Americanum.
How can we make sense of these competing truths?
Patrick Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed claims to offer
both an explanation and a call to action. He argues
that both statements above are true: liberalism has failed
precisely because it has succeeded. Though the book was
completed immediately before the 2016 American election, it helps us understand what has happened since.
Deneen calls liberalism the oldest and last major modern ideology to have “proposed transforming all aspects
of human life to conform to a preconceived plan.” But
where the others have failed, liberalism has succeeded,
shaping our modern culture, politics, and society. For
Deneen, a professor of political science at Notre Dame,
liberalism is essentially a 500-year-old wager that the
world would improve if we re-ordered our politics.
Liberalism proposed that we conceive of humans as
rights-bearing individuals who could fashion and pursue their own versions of the good life. This would be
best achieved by a free-market economic system and a
limited government legitimated by free-and-fair elections.
Yet something has gone awry:

The breadth of Deneen’s critique—with chapters analyzing everything from politics and economics to education and science and technology—comes at the cost of
nuance, but it also means that there is something for
everyone. Deneen has received praise from across the
ideological spectrum, including from Cornel West, who
called the book “courageous and timely” in light of “the
rude awakening of the Trump moment,” adding that “if
we remain tied to liberalism’s failure, more inequality,
repression, and spiritual emptiness await us.” The diagnosis proposed in Why Liberalism Failed has also resonated with the right. Both David Brooks and Ross Douthat
have written appreciative op-eds in The New York Times,
and Gene Callahan has called the book “vitally important
for understanding the present crisis of Western politics”
in the pages of The American Conservative.
The effect for most readers, liberal or conservative, must
be simultaneous approval and scepticism. Deneen is critical of laissez-faire economics and a reliance on market
mechanisms, and points to income inequality, climate
change, resource depletion, groundwater contamination,
and species extinction as evidence of liberalism’s failure.
Yet he’s also critical of secularism and “infinitely fluid
sexual identity,” and sees declining birth rates and rising
divorce rates as signs of cultural crisis. His comments
on feminism offer an example: he approvingly cites the
Marxist feminist theorist Nancy Fraser to comment on
the exploitation of women in the “workforce of market
capitalism,” but then ultimately suggests that they might
have been better off if they had never entered the workforce at all.
Why Liberalism Failed is a call for deep pessimism both
about our current world and the achievements of modernity. While it appeals to sceptics of all stripes, not all are
convinced by the apparent signs of decay. Interestingly,
another strain of argument has appeared alongside it in
the Trump era—one that seeks to reassure us that everything is totally fine. Why Liberalism Failed is, in effect,
the direct antithesis of Stephen Pinker’s new book Enlightenment Now, which claims that human beings are now
flourishing. Pinker argues that human beings are healthier, richer, and better educated than ever before, and
proposes that these advances are a direct result of the
Enlightenment itself. Where Deneen claims that the ideas
of the “Age of Revolutions” have failed, Pinker writes
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triumphantly that “the Enlightenment has worked.”* Where
Pinker notes that economic growth has skyrocketed,
Deneen highlights that wealth is concentrated in the hands
of the one-percent. Where Pinker argues that the scientific revolution has drastically improved our quality of
life, Deneen points out that this has come at the cost
of environmental degradation that now threatens the
existence of the species. Pinker claims that progress has
materialized because people are free to get what they
want. Deneen denies that freedom consists in an abundance of lifestyle choices.
What Pinker and Deneen have in common, however, is the
all-or-nothing approach they take to their topics. Pinker
refuses to acknowledge the idea that some things have
gotten better while others have gotten worse; his exaggerated optimism leads him to dismiss any potential
reservations about progress as trivial. Likewise, Deneen
ignores the elements of liberalism that made it initially
appealing. And when he does acknowledge those better
elements—constitutionalism, limited government, individual rights—he claims that they in fact predate liberalism and can outlast it: “protection of rights of individuals
and the belief in inviolable human dignity, if not always
consistently recognized and practiced, were nevertheless philosophical achievements of premodern medieval
Europe.” We can have our cake and eat it too.
At their root, both stories rest on secularized forms of
Christian faith—either a faith in progress and the realization of God’s design, or a conviction that what we have
witnessed is the fall of man. Nonetheless, Deneen’s argument explains much more than Pinker’s. Deneen offers
a philosophy of history that explains not only why things
have gotten so bad, but why they are bound to get worse:
liberalism can never succeed because its underlying
assumptions and ideas are ill-conceived. While Pinker
gives a wealth of statistics proving how great things are,

reinterpretation—indeed, a whole new definition—of liberty
and of the human person. Deneen bemoans the fact that
while freedom for the pre-moderns meant virtue and the
capacity for self-government, freedom now means liberation from all arbitrariness that determines us without
our choosing—including liberation from authority, culture,
tradition, and nature. Human beings are defined as fundamentally autonomous creatures, animals driven above
all by self-interest. One consequence of this is that all
human relationships—familial, neighborly, communal,
and religious—are only legitimate if they are freely
chosen. As a result, liberalism “teaches people to hedge
commitments and adopt flexible relationships and bonds”
and ultimately destroys the forms of unchosen attachment
that hold communities together. Liberalism appeared to
work for so long because it relied on pre-liberal resources to maintain a moral and cultural consensus, but
over time it wore away these bonds without being able
to replenish or replace them. Deneen holds that market
mechanisms only function when local customs and cultures check the selfish desires of individual actors. What
we are witnessing now is the triumph of depersonalized
market relationships and the decline of any checks on
corporate greed. Without these norms, the state enters
to forcibly sustain order. All that is not restrained by law
is permitted, rendering law the only tool that remains to
guide conduct. In the absence of behavioural standards,
Deneen claims, the only body that can combat the conflicts that arise is the state.
This leads to Deneen’s surprising next point: individualism and statism actually depend upon and reinforce one
another. Having shorn communal and institutional ties
that once offered sustenance, people are forced to turn
to the state in times of need. Deneen views the main
political options in the United States, embodied by the
orthodoxy of the Democratic and Republican parties, as
two sides of the same ideological coin—as merely two

6 THE BREADTH OF DENEEN’S CRITIQUE—WITH

CHAPTERS ANALYZING EVERYTHING FROM
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS TO EDUCATION
AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY—COMES AT
THE COST OF NUANCE, BUT IT ALSO MEANS
THAT THERE IS SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE.
these provide no guarantee that things will continue that
way. Because it fails to address the possibility of increased
bloodshed, inequality, social disintegration, and climate
catastrophe, his argument is unlikely to persuade anyone
who doesn’t already believe the Leibnizian mantra that
we live in the best of all possible worlds.

OF COURSE, Deneen doesn’t actually believe that liberalism has failed. It has not collapsed, which is why
Deneen feels compelled to deal it a death blow. In fact,
he indicates that without any intervention it is possible
that liberalism could continue for quite some time. In
his view, things could get much worse, and he indulges
in speculation of a future “deep state” imposing liberal
order by fiat despite a lack of popular support. This is
why, perhaps counterintuitively, Deneen so forcefully
tries to convince readers to reject liberalism.
He has two main arguments. First, while liberalism presents itself as a neutral system, it has actually sought to
remake the world in its own image. It was founded on a

different forms of liberalism. He heaps scorn on both the
Left and the Right. While so-called conservatives express
hostility towards state expansion, they consistently turn
to the state in order to create “free markets” and destroy
all traditional norms that might prevent the market’s
penetration into the life of a community. Like Bernard
Harcourt’s The Illusion of Free Markets, he demonstrates
that the market is a political creation that always required
political and administrative regulation. In reality, today’s
conservatives—from Paul Ryan to John Bolton—are classical liberals. And while progressives claim that an expansive state is the ultimate protector of individual liberty,
Deneen notes that they seek to limit the role of the state
when it comes to personal and sexual autonomy. Ultimately, both camps only further contribute to individual
fragmentation, and both fail to address deregulation,
globalization, and soaring economic inequalities. For all
Americans who celebrate choice, political options in the
Land of the Free start to seem meager.

IF LIBERALISM HAS FAILED, Deneen suggests that one
possible outcome is to replace it with another system.
So what comes after liberalism? His solution is a form of

localism, focused on sustaining culture within communities, fostering “household economics,” and creating forms
of self-governance that include greater civic participation. Deneen proposes that we return to the land, grow
our own food, and find small communities of like-minded
others. In short, we should live like the Amish. It’s ultimately just a nominally secular version of what Rod Dreher
calls “the Benedict option,” a social opt-out for Christians
to maintain their faith by forming intentional communities and removing themselves from mainstream society.
Following such a forceful critique of the Western social
order, Deneen’s alternative is underwhelming. But perhaps
that’s the point. Deneen wants to avoid giving us a prescription. He evinces a profound scepticism of any pure
theory that claims to tell us how to live, and instead seeks
forms of life that originate in the creation of new traditions. “The impulse to devise a new and better political
theory in the wake of liberalism’s simultaneous triumph
and demise is a temptation that must be resisted,” he
writes. “The search for a comprehensive theory is what
gave rise to liberalism and successor ideologies in the
first place.” Instead, what we need is not a better theory
but better praxis.
And yet for someone so adamant about escaping the
clutches of ideology, Deneen imputes a great deal of
agency to liberalism. In Why Liberalism Failed, it is liberalism—and not any particular writers, politicians, or social
reformers—that drives history. Deneen writes as though
liberalism has its own beliefs, executes its own plans,
and takes its own actions. We are all liberalism’s victims,
he claims. But where are its perpetrators?
This is why Why Liberalism Failed fails. Liberalism is not
an agent. Nor is it a coherent idea with a unified form,
but rather a series of ideas and political movements that
evolved over time. Deneen presents its failure as inevitable—a result of its inner contradictions—and makes
the current moment seem predestined from liberalism’s
creation. He does this by overstating the importance of
autonomy as the singularly liberal value, and by collapsing what were historically distinct demands for freedom
into a single doctrine. In the process, he collapses diverse
thinkers into a single monolithic progression from the past
to the present. He believes, rather anachronistically, that
thinkers ranging from Luther and Hobbes to Machiavelli
and Rousseau were all working to establish liberalism, an
idea which would have been foreign—if not outrageous—to
most of them. Freedom from religious persecution, from
foreign domination, and from arbitrary rule are all distinct demands. While later demands for freedom built
upon the successes of earlier struggles, our current world
was not determined at the outset of modernity.

* Stephen Pinker, Enlightenment Now. (Viking, 2018).
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TRANSLATING
MARX BURLE

the so-called Brazilian economic miracle of the seventies
that urbanized the country, and the national desire for
modernization and progress that fueled massive investment in infrastructure and development. It was during
this time that Burle Marx gave his depositions on a variety of aesthetic and political issues, from advocacy for
national park preservation to which architectural flourishes were the ugliest (“sculptures of heroes,” “poorly
pruned trees”). Despite Burle Marx’s position within a
brutally repressive state regime, the depositions appeal
to emotions, common sense, and the law to defy the dictatorship’s stance on development and endorse the preservation of Brazil’s flora and fauna.
Seavitt Nordenson fills her text with photographs, renderings, and blueprints of Burle Marx’s work that ask us to
consider the connection between his visual artistry and
textual advocacy. Devoid of people, the landscapes could
just as easily be mockups, yet they are familiar to those
who have walked through Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte,
or São Paulo. Oh, so that was Burle Marx’s too? With kaleidoscopic glasses, I revisit my quotidian familiarity with
these environments in light of Burle Marx’s vision for them
as planned and political. In their physical materiality, the
landscapes are incontrovertible testaments to the fact that
beyond these orations, something was built. Yet there is
something outside the gardens’ physicality that haunts.
As my mind’s eye revisits the shimmering, transforming
views of the Parque do Flamengo, I wonder whether their
aesthetics, and indeed their place in my life, can be separated from the project of their inception. Especially in
today’s political climate, in which political trials explode
months before a national election, the gardens are uncomfortable reminders of the dictatorial state.

MILITARY DICTATORSHIP, popular culture suggests, is gray,
cold, and orderly. Its abuses of power take place on wellpaved roads in uniformly dense cities containing only
right angles. Its grocery stores have only beige foods, and
its schoolchildren sing songs in high-pitched horrormovie unison. Its marching policemen all lift their knees
to the same height. Gardens, parks, backyards, and topiary structures, one would imagine, are low on the state’s
priority list.
Not so in dictatorial Brazil, where prominent landscape
architect Roberto Burle Marx spent the thirties to the
sixties designing tableaux that were part tropical paradise, part modernist utopia. His designs draw out striking
contrasts between the natural and built environment
by juxtaposing lanky palm trees with refined azulejo
mosaics, or graceful constructed waterways with desert
flora. His Parque do Flamengo in Rio de Janeiro looks at
once like a series of amoebas and a collection of flying
discs carving clean lines into the bushy green landscape.
Whimsical though they may be, his designs also represent an arm of the Brazilian dictatorial state: Burle Marx
served in the Federal Council of Culture during the country’s second dictatorship, and many of his works were
commissioned by top state officials.

Through their juxtapositions with the text and with each
other, Seavitt Nordenson’s curatorial choices in Depositions
are a collage in their own right. The interplay between
artistic intent and viewer interpretation gives the volume
layers—the more it is picked up, leafed through, and put
down again, the more it reveals meaning. Yet her critical
commentary on the broader visual culture of Brazil during
the sixties is often lacking. Offering images of political
events, Brazilian heads of state, and works by other artists,
she remarks that the images “reveal what is not said,” but
refrains from providing her own commentary about what
is said, or what she might say. She chooses to depict
Getúlio Vargas, the fourteenth president of Brazil, grinning wildly atop a horse, bearing closer resemblance to a
child on a show pony than a head of state in an equestrian
pose. Was this Seavitt Nordenson’s way of conveying derision for the president-turned-dictator? Or was the image
simply comical, a tickling gem of the archive she hoped
would see the light of day? Images like these are as intriguing as they are puzzling.

As a work of translation, Depositions delivers. Seavitt
Nordenson is an excellent translator: technical terms,
colloquial language, and idioms flow without a hitch. She
is also discriminating, careful to translate necessary
words while not overburdening us with excessive vocabulary. Her work as a translator is particularly vital because
so few of Burle Marx’s depositions have been translated
into English, and much of the supplementary material
she draws upon is only available in Portuguese. More
importantly, the book helps us reflect on the ideological
Between 1967 and 1974, Burle Marx delivered a series of
opportunities of translation. Seavitt Nordenson’s desire
position pieces to the Federal Council of Culture from
for readers to “take Burle Marx at his word” reveals the
his position as one of the council’s appointees. Catherine importance of bringing new angles of engagement to
Seavitt Nordenson, a landscape architect and associate
our American-centered critique. For example, she points
professor of architecture at the City College of New York, out that Burle Marx’s insistence on the compatibility
provides original translations and context for the writings
between economic development and ecological preserof Burle Marx in Depositions: Roberto Burle Marx and
vation cannot be derived from the two American schools
Public Landscapes Under Dictatorship (2018). Though
of natural preservation exemplified by John Muir and
readers might come into Depositions familiar with the
Gifford Pinchot. Burle Marx’s perspective is something
political implications of urban planning or architecture, new entirely, and we would be wise to investigate the
Seavitt Nordenson demonstrates that in Brazil during
“union of nature and nationhood” he exemplifies. By
the 1960s, even landscape architecture was political. The undertaking the translation project that is Depositions,
book’s introduction offers the uninitiated reader a clear
Seavitt Nordenson injects new life into the Englishintroduction to the key forces in Brazilian politics of the
language discourse on landscape architecture and on
time: the 1964 coup that resulted in a military dictatorship, modernism’s reverberations across the world.
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Yet Depositions is far from a mere translation of Burle
Burle Marx’s work, noting that he was more concerned
Marx’s transcribed orations. Seavitt Nordenson provides
with advancing the “culture of the environment” than advoa critical and historical framework with which to intercating for “individual human rights.” Indeed, she notes
pret his depositions. Precisely because so little of this
that his decision to work for the military regime was
work has been translated, its content is largely unfamil- “ethically fraught,” but she does not dive into what these
iar to non-Portuguese-speaking audiences. The choices
ethics entail. As readers, we miss the opportunity to
Seavitt Nordenson makes to contextualize the deposiconsider how the utopia of the ecologically-minded elite
tions thus have a profound role in shaping how the reader affected the candangos, because the candangos’ history
will view Burle Marx’s work and the history of Brazilian
and context do not rank high enough on the list of Seavitt
state-sponsored architecture more broadly. In that light, Nordenson’s concerns. Rather than rewriting the cangreat responsibility rests on Seavitt Nordenson ’s shouldangos’ history to accompany Burle Marx’s work, Seavitt
ders, and at times she does not carry through.
Nordenson replicates the stories of power Brazilians
already know so that English-speaking audiences can
One of Seavitt Nordenson’s great strengths is her clarity
participate in its reproduction.
in conveying the history of Brazil’s military dictatorship
from 1964 to 1985. Her account combines the succinctOddly, in a book dedicated to the designs of Burle Marx,
ness of a crash-course textbook with the allure of walking
we don’t get to know much at all about Burle Marx the
through a gallery of Brazil’s notable moments. The nagperson. By piecing together details, we determine that
ging question that remains, however, is whether the story Burle Marx was safe in his status within Brazil’s white
of the great men of the dictatorship was the right one to
intelligentsia. Seavitt Nordenson reveals this in subtle
tell. It is certainly critical to understanding Burle Marx’s
ways, like when she notes that he developed close ties
oeuvre that we consider its historical context and his par- to people with political power early in his career. Yet
ticipation in the project of national progress, even if his
without a deep investigation of Burle Marx’s background,
work aimed to criticize it from within. Seavitt Nordenson her cross-examination of his work—and its political
sells us on the idea that landscape architecture is politimplications—seems lacking. Beyond her gloss on Burle
ical insofar as it was done for the great political movers Marx’s fraught complicity with the dictatorship, Seavitt
and shakers of Brazil. Yet Seavitt Nordenson’s historical
Nordenson avoids holding Burle Marx accountable for
sketch is the cookie cutter one: she tells us of the modhow his utopic visions could undermine the interests of
ernist artists like Mário de Andrade and Anita Malfatti,
common people. Burle Marx seems to spend all of his
the heads of state like Vargas, and all the pertinent elites time thinking about the distribution of flora and no time
with which Brazilian schools familiarize their students.
thinking about the distribution of people, particularly
She is often concerned with high art and how Burle Marx indigenous people, who inhabit it. If Burle Marx did not
fits within the small world that was in constant conversaconsider them, Seavitt Nordenson should have. What
tion with European artists and thinkers like Le Corbusier. motivated Burle Marx? Should we read his ecological
She also emphasizes the precedent for Burle Marx’s work
depositions as resistance against the military regime,
in the colonial gardens of the Portuguese court, highlight- as Seavitt Nordenson suggests, if he hardly challenged
ing the Europe-Brazil connection as though it were natural
its oppression? Were there moments of uncertainty,
and inevitable. American scholars tend to believe that if
guilt, betrayal? An increased emphasis on Burle Marx’s

10 ESPECIALLY IN TODAY’S POLITICAL CLIMATE,

IN WHICH POLITICAL TRIALS EXPLODE
MONTHS BEFORE A NATIONAL ELECTION,
THE GARDENS ARE UNCOMFORTABLE
REMINDERS OF THE DICTATORIAL STATE.
you tell the elite’s story of the Global South, you get the
story right—Seavitt Nordenson falls squarely into this trap.
Fixated on the stories that Brazilians in power already
tell, she misses the opportunity to elaborate on another
way in which landscape architecture is political: the way
it moves and shapes the non-elites.
In some moments, this angle emerges. Seavitt Nordenson
remarks that the plan for the zoo botanical garden in
Brasília would have displaced people in Candangolândia,
a settlement for workers brought in to build the city. She
also points out Burle Marx’s grappling with how his landscapes might bulldoze over favelas. Yet Seavitt Nordenson
fails to mention that the candangos after whom Candangolândia is named were primarily black and brown, usually the poorest residents of the adjacent states willing
to do itinerant work for the wealthy bureaucrats who
envisioned a utopic city. Upon the completion of Brazil’s
capital, the candangos were expected either to return to
their former homes or to live in satellite cities far from
the main metropolis. In short, the candangos were envisioned from the start as a disposable labor force that
would not participate in the project their labor helped
create. Seavitt Nordenson acknowledges this tension in

biography and the effect of his landscapes on the nonelites might have brought us to the final way in which
landscape architecture is political: it is political only
insofar as it is personal.
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EAGLETON BELIEVES THAT SACRIFICE is a crucial model for
modern politics. He begins with a compelling argument:
“if sacrifice is a political act, it is not least because it concerns an accession to power.” He says that “[s]acrifice
concerns the passage of the lowly, unremarkable thing
from weakness to power…If sacrifice is often violent, it is
because the depth of the change it promises cannot be a
matter of smooth evolution or simple continuity.” This is
an appealing notion for the religious leftist reader: it is a
framework for the transformation of the downtrodden into
the powerful, an alchemic formula that transforms the
weak into the strong. In a world where religion is deployed
to prop up unjust and cruel uses of power, to use religious
discourse to argue for the political—not just spiritual—
power of the weak is innovative. Eagleton’s attempt to do
so is praiseworthy. In imagining sacrifice as the transformation of the downtrodden to the powerful, he offers a
metaphysical grounding for a leftist political project.
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THE BACK COVER OF TERRY EAGLETON’S RADICAL SACRIFICE
bills the book as an “analysis of sacrifice as the foundation of the modern, as well as the ancient, social order.”
This is an exciting proposition for exploration, with the
potential to provide a new way of conceptualizing what
religion can offer to our understandings of society. Disappointingly, Radical Sacrifice does not deliver on this
ambitious goal. Almost the entirety of Eagleton’s slim volume reads as a literature review rather than a manifesto
full of innovative ideas. Despite consistently stunning
prose, reading Radical Sacrifice often feels like being
stuck in conversation at a cocktail party with a philosophy major acutely aware of how well-read he is.
The titles of the book’s five chapters promise to address
hot topics in culture, history, and metaphysics: “Radical
Sacrifice,” “Tragedy and Crucifixion,” “Martyrdom and
Mortality,” “Exchange and Excess,” and finally “Kings
and Beggars.” The eponymous first chapter is the only
one in which Eagleton’s purported topic is addressed at
any length; the following chapters, with the exception of
the final pages of “Kings and Beggars,” cover ideas only
loosely connected to the idea of sacrifice, and even then
bringing the themes together requires some real intellectual legwork. Eagleton leaves that work for the reader,
instead presenting atomized units that discuss, in order,
the nature of the Crucifixion, death, gift-giving, and the
scapegoat. (As the reader will notice, the chapter titles
are sometimes helpful and sometimes misleading.)
Eagleton, who is writing from a Catholic Marxist perspective, confidently informs the reader that his book “broods
on questions not commonly investigated by the political
left, and certainly not by its postmodern wing. Love, death,
suffering, sacrifice, evil, martyrdom, forgiveness and so
on are not exactly modish preoccupations among cultural
or political theorists today.” To bring these questions into
postmodern academic discourse is an admirable goal,
but in attempting to do so, Eagleton ignores those who
have been working with them outside his own intellectual
milieu and thus puts forth a shortsighted argument.

But where does this framework of sacrifice come from?
Eagleton does not provide a satisfying genealogy. Radical
Sacrifice is a book that quotes frequently and at length.
Each page is replete with references to philosophy and
literature; Eagleton cites sources ranging from Hegel to
Shakespeare. (King Lear is a particular favorite.) Of course,
the two-and-a-half centuries between Hegel and Shakespeare are not the only ones available to Eagleton; still,
one often gets the sense that the quotations in Radical
Sacrifice are the selections of an erudite man remembering something he already knows rather than the result of
novel research. Although the text strives, per the introduction, not to “take the dismissive attitude to theology
generally to be found among left wingers,” one notes the
absence of any theologian writing after Thomas Aquinas.
There is great merit in seeking to use sources from one’s
own area of expertise and intellectual lineage to answer
new and important questions. However, Eagleton’s seeming ignorance of sources outside of his postmodern
critical framework leads to an impoverished analysis of
his subject. There exist libraries upon libraries of liberal
Christian and non-Christian theology that Eagleton does
not so much as mention and which could have deeply
enhanced his argument. His blinders in this area are a
significant obstacle to both the coherence of his theory
and its trustworthiness.

EAGLETON’S NOTION OF SACRIFICE depends on Christian
supersessionist attitudes towards Judaism. Supersessionism is the perspective which, as David Novak defines
it, “sees Judaism and the Jewish people as that which the
triumph of Christianity over history has left in the irretrievable past.”* “In speaking of ‘a new covenant,’ He [Jesus]
has made the first one obsolete,” says Paul in Hebrews
8:13. God had made a covenant with the Jews, but once
Jesus came, Christians became true participants in God’s
covenant, and Jews, who had rejected Jesus as the messiah,
were no longer deserving of that covenantal relationship.
Supersessionism, which had been the dominant approach
to Jews and Judaism within Christianity until modern
reckonings with anti-Semitism, treats Jesus as the “fulfillment” of Jewish Law, bringing the Law to its telos and
thus ending its claims on the faithful.
The supersessionist attitude towards the Law goes beyond
rejecting it or treating it as obsolete. Paul says of the Law
that “[t]he sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the
law” (1 Corinthians 15:46). The Law he is referring to is what
was at the time becoming rabbinic law. The stereotype
that treats this Law as antithetical to love and mercy, and
therefore the Jews who follow it as cruel and hardhearted,
has been used to justify anti-Semitism for centuries. The
prototypical example of this is, of course, Shakespeare’s
Shylock, the Jewish moneylender, who insists in The
Merchant of Venice on receiving the pound of flesh he is
owed despite the human cost.
Among the best-known moments in The Merchant of
Venice is Portia’s speech about mercy. Dressed as a man
and pretending to be a lawyer, Portia argues that Shylock
ought to spare Antonio from giving the pound of flesh
he has promised as a guarantee for his friend Bassanio,
Antonio having found himself unable to repay the loan in

cash. Shylock has refused Bassanio’s offer of twice the
money he is owed, insisting instead on the contractual
pound of flesh. Portia entreats Shylock to be merciful:
It is an attribute to God himself,
And earthly power doth then show likest God’s
When mercy seasons justice. Therefore, Jew,
Though justice be thy plea, consider this:
That in the course of justice none of us
Should see salvation. We do pray for mercy,
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render
The deeds of mercy. (IV.i.179–197)

Portia contrasts Shylock’s drive for justice, for being given
what he is owed, with mercy. It is not justice, that strict
insistence on rule-following, that will bring salvation, she
contends. It is mercy, which is a defining attribute of God.
The implication behind these arguments is clear: the Law
has been superseded not merely because it is outdated,
but because it is barbarous. This is a paradigm that has
permeated Western society for centuries, and it is one
that Eagleton buys wholeheartedly.

IN OUR MODERN, MULTICULTURAL, LIBERAL SOCIETY, it is
taken for granted that Judaism is one religion among
many, part of a grand conversation among equally valid
visions of divine service and meaning. But Eagleton’s
text demonstrates that this is not yet the case in some
branches of Christian thought. In explaining how sacrifice moved from a physical ritual to the concept he wishes
to discuss, Eagleton asserts that “it was the exile of the
Israelites and the destruction of the Temple that forced
the moral or spiritual aspects of sacrifice to the fore.” It
is certainly accurate that the destruction of the Temple
in Jerusalem by Romans in the year 70 CE led to a religious reckoning, both in emerging Rabbinic Judaism as

non-sacrificial ritual practice. Eagleton’s statement treats
Christianity as the inevitable—and only—replacement of
Temple sacrifice. It is perhaps this troubling assumption
that leads to the greatest problem in his work: the conflation of sacrifice and martyrdom.
By the end of the first chapter, Eagleton has shifted from
a discussion of cultic ritual sacrifice and its nature to
the martyrdom of Jesus. In attempting to reconcile how the
Biblical prophets can both endorse sacrifice and claim
that it is inadequate, he concludes that “[t]he oblation that
counts is the surrender of one’s selfish interests for
the sake of others,” and then proceeds to assume that “the
surrender of one’s selfish interests” is identical with
the surrender of one’s very life.
Without the slightest acknowledgement of a transition
from one subject to another, Eagleton begins to discuss
the Crucifixion’s political nature: “[i]t is the tale of a how
sacrifice as selfless devotion is likely to result in a bloody
execution at the hands of the state.” Though Eagleton
devotes an entire chapter to the nature of martyrdom, he
in no place acknowledges that martyrdom is not a mere
subcategory of sacrifice. There is a world of difference
between sacrificing something that belongs to oneself
and sacrificing one’s very life.
By treating the death of Jesus as the paradigmatic sacrifice and the historical culmination of such acts, Eagleton
not only creates a framework for understanding leftism
that is dangerous in its political expectations, but also
actively participates in a history of Christian supersessionism that has done great violence to Jews and that continues to ignore the enduring value and relevance of the
Law to a living group. Eagleton believes that the Law “is
perverse to the core…Though it is blameless in itself, it
resembles the kind of grossly inadequate parent who can
do no more than rub our noses in where we go wrong.” He
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ENDURING VALUE AND RELEVANCE OF THE
LAW TO A LIVING GROUP.
well as in the developing Jesus movement. Both groups
increasingly prioritized abstract thinking and ideas, in a
transition from the stark physicality of animal sacrifice.
However, Eagleton goes on to claim, “acts of love and
mercy came to assume place of pride over donations
of corn or the shedding of lambs’ blood. It is the lowly of
spirit who are great in God’s esteem, not goats or handfuls of grain.”
This analysis of the transition from cultic Temple sacrifice to a different form of religious practice is one that
assumes that the rightful successor to the Jewish Temple
cult is the Christian religion. It is only in Christianity that
“acts of love and mercy” have the “place of pride.” Though
love and mercy are of course important in Judaism, the
central religious emphasis is the study of legal text and

adds that “it is a useful device for the moral tenderfoot,
even if it proves superfluous for those who have spiritually come of age. The Law is a ladder to be kicked away
once we have mounted it.”
For Jewish readers who consider themselves bound to
follow the Law, this is plainly insulting, a dig at a meaningful model of community and service of God, and an
assertion that Jews have not “spiritually come of age.” But
as modern Christians—in particular Catholics post-Vatican
II—work to rectify their long history of anti-Semitism, the
concept of the Law has been decoupled in Christian
thought from the idea of the Jewish commitment to it. The
Law is a “vindictive campaign to bring us to nothing,” says
Eagleton, not a defining idea for any real people. By abstracting a concept that is in reality a present and vibrant

force in the lives of many Jews, Eagleton articulates what
would, in a medieval text, read as an attack on Jews.
Eagleton’s reduction of the Law to an abstract, noxious
force not anchored in any real lives is disturbing, but it
is consonant with strands of modern Christian discourse
that deride the Law as merciless without directing that
criticism at those who observe the Law. More distressing still is his intellectual abstraction from the lives and
suffering of Jews.
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of a stake in the status quo than the well-heeled, they
have less to lose from the impending upheaval which
Marx calls Communism and Christian Gospel calls the
Kingdom of God, and are thus more likely to be open
to its advent. Only by living its wretched condition to
the full can it hope to annul it, and in doing so abolish
itself. Seen in this light, revolution is a modern version
of what the ancient world knew as sacrifice.

This is a politics that cherishes the suffering of the weak
until the moment it can be made useful. It is the hazard
In “Kings and Beggars,” his final chapter, Eagleton devotes of a religion based on the fetishization of the act of ultimuch ink to a discussion of Italian philosopher Giorgio
mate sacrifice. To understand suffering as beautiful, and
Agamben’s analysis of the Muselmann. The “Muselmänner” to transfigure or import that idea into a political ideolwere those Jews who, forced into concentration camps
ogy, is to wager victory at the expense of those who are
during the Holocaust, had in their starvation and despair suffering. Uplifting the idea of wretchedness will lead to
given up on life. The term originated in the camps themwretchedness being preserved. Weakness must never go
selves and has been used by numerous survivors in written unaddressed in an attempt to create change. An ideology
and oral testimony. The horror of these people’s lives is
that glorifies pain is one that will allow pain to continue.
still present in living memory, but Eagleton treats this
Suffering is never beautiful.
horror as simply an academic curiosity, an example of “a
kind of living death.” He claims that “this ravaged creature
is not even tragic, at least in the classical sense of a protagonist raised by his death to sublime status” and adds EAGLETON’S SUPERSESSIONISM and his advocacy of selfthat “[t]he Muselmann offers men and women an icon of
sacrifice as the ideal model for modern Marxism are
their own inhumanity, without a confession of which there not unrelated. Because he views Jesus’s death as the ultiwould be no possibility of redemption.”
mate moment of sacrifice, the purest distillation of the
idea, he does not consider the possibility of a model in
The only source Eagleton draws from on the Muselmann
which sacrifice can stop short of one’s own life.
is Agamben’s book, Remnants of Auschwitz, a philosophical analysis of survivors’ testimony of the death camp.
Judaism offers another option. In the Ein Yaakov, a collecHe cites no Jewish scholars and certainly no Jewish sur- tion of all of the stories in the Talmud, one finds a dispute
vivors. Real Jews here are as invisible to Eagleton as they about which verse is the most important in the Bible. The
are in his discussion of the Law. Eagleton treats Jewish
scholar Ben Azzai suggests that it is Genesis 5:1, “this is
death as being noteworthy only when it can raise a victim the record of Adam’s line,” the account of Creation. Rabbi
to “sublime status.” He ignores a rich literature of Jewish
Akiva offers that it is “love your fellow as yourself.” Shimon
post-Holocaust theology to instead instrumentalize the
ben Pazi, by contrast, offers a less intuitive answer in
suffering and murder of Jews within his Christian philoso- Exodus 29:39: “You shall offer the one lamb in the mornphical project. Eagleton’s Muselmann is not a person but ing, and you shall offer the other lamb at twilight.” This is
a “ravaged creature” and an “icon.” Auschwitz is an interthe commandment to offer the Korban Tamid, the daily
esting moment in the history of ideas, not the site of a
offering in the Temple, a model of sacrifice in which
genocide. Jews exist in Eagleton’s thought only as obso- one dedicates all the days of one’s life to a transcendent
lete half-siblings or as victims, paradigms of death. This
ideal, not through offering one’s life in suffering but by
is an act of intellectual violence.
committing to daily work. The revolution Eagleton seeks
will not be found in martyrdom but in achievable sacrifices, regularly offered.

EAGLETON’S THEORIZING is built on a disregard for Jews and
Jewish bodies as well as the assumption that Jews are only
relevant insofar as they participate in—or, really, represent
ideas that are important to—his Christian framework. But
any attempt to create a Christian metaphysics compatible with contemporary leftist ideology must grapple with
supersessionism. Christianity has historically been the
source of terrible violence: in the form of missionary work,
conquest, pogroms, and more. This gory heritage is one
with intellectual underpinnings, and supersessionism
is implicated in tremendous Jewish suffering. There are
theologians doing that work, but Eagleton, with his intellectual blinkers, does not concern himself with them. He
thus illustrates the potential pitfalls of a leftism based in
Christian thought.
In the final twenty pages of the book, where he at long last
makes his argument, Eagleton proposes that the proletariat equals the scapegoat equals Jesus. The scapegoat
is powerful, he says, because
the more besmirched it becomes, staggering under the
weight of the transgressions heaped on its head, the
more admirably selfless it shows itself to be. Its redemptive power grows as its identification with human sin
deepens, which is one reason why the sacrificial beast,
like all sacred things, is both blessed and cursed. The
scapegoat is an unthinkable animal, at once guilty and
innocent, blessed and cursed, poison and cure.

Revolution to create a just world does not require death.
It instead demands a life oriented towards the pursuit
of a set of ultimate ideals. There is radicalism in regular
observances—indeed, in Law. To commit oneself daily to
a set of transcendent precepts, precepts that defy conventional logic and cut against the less explicit but no less
present rules of a fundamentally unjust society, is also
revolutionary. To adhere to Divine Law, the Law of a God
who, as in Christianity, is hopelessly in love with humanity,
instead of the fickle and malleable norms of a culture that
elevates individual success over care for each of God’s
beloved children, is a means of making this love manifest
through consistent, small actions.
In his supersessionist bias, Eagleton misses an opportunity to draw from an alternate Biblical picture of a human
life offered on an altar. If the Binding of Isaac—which
Eagleton mentions only once, in passing—is a simple prefiguration of the Crucifixion and Resurrection, then it
does not add to our understanding of sacrifice. But taken
on its own terms, the Akedah is a vision of martyrdom as
sacrifice in which it is possible to suffer but not die, to
sacrifice much of what one has without sacrificing oneself, to be on the altar but for God to stay the knife. What
if we had a politics that treated each life not as valuable
enough to sacrifice, but as too valuable?

Karl Marx, says Eagleton, views the scapegoat as a “revolutionary agent.” Eagleton writes,
Like the sacrificial tribute, it signifies the gain of humanity through the loss of it. Because the poor have less

* David Novak, “Beyond Supersessionism,” First Things,
March 1998, www.firstthings.com/article/1998/03/005beyond-supersessionism.
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motive. But the motive for other genocides may be,
for instance, territorial conquest, economic gain, or
religious domination. The intent is what matters: that
the destruction of the group is consciously desired.
So, although the Holocaust gave rise to the term
“genocide,” not all cases of genocide are the same, or
perhaps as extreme, as the Holocaust.
The term “ethnic cleansing” was used in World War Two
and then again by Bosnian Serbs in the 1990s. It means
the forcible expulsion of a community from its home
region. Ethnic cleansing can be accomplished by committing genocidal massacres to terrorise survivors and
make them flee, or it can be achieved without genocide.
But it too is a crime against international law. In 2002
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ratified by 119 states) recognized that forced displacement
and deportation, even in peacetime, constitute crimes
against humanity when they are “committed as part of
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population.”
Since the Nazi Holocaust, “extermination” has also been
a crime against humanity. Extermination is slightly different from genocide. It includes massacres, but also “the
intentional infliction of conditions of life,” that is “calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.” The purpose of these crimes is not relevant to guilt,
nor do charges of crimes against humanity require proof
of specific “intent to destroy” a group. And in the case of
a crime against humanity like extermination, unlike
genocide, the persecuted group could be a social or a
political group.
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IN AUGUST 1941, Winston Churchill described Hitler’s
attack on the Soviet Union: “whole districts are being
exterminated…Since the Mongol invasions of Europe in
the Sixteenth Century, there has never been methodical,
merciless butchery on such a scale…We are in the presence
of a crime without a name.” News was also leaking out
about the ongoing Nazi slaughter of nearly six million
Jews in Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic states, and other Nazioccupied territories. In 1943, the Polish Jewish jurist
Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide” for the
Holocaust of the Jews, the Armenian Genocide in World
War One, and other cases in global history. In 1945, the
world said “Never Again.”
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide came into force as an international treaty in 1950. It has been signed and ratified by 140
nations. The Convention defines genocide as acts such
as “killing members of the group” that are perpetrated
with the intent to destroy, “in whole or in part,” a “national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” Acts of genocide also include “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part.”
Three points are worth making about genocide in international law:
1) Political and social groups are not protected by the
Genocide Convention—only national, ethnic, racial
and religious groups. Social scientists object to this.
Judges have to ignore them.
2) It is not necessary for a perpetrator to intend to
destroy an entire group. Acts committed with the
intent to destroy a substantial part of a protected
group constitute genocide.
3) The perpetrator’s motive is not mentioned in the 1948
Convention. The particular motive or purpose of the
crime is irrelevant in determining guilt. Racial hatred,
like that of the Nazis for Jews, may be the main

Although many regard genocide as a twentieth-century
phenomenon, only the term itself and the 1948 criminalization of the act are specific to the twentieth century.
Similar acts, and similar concepts, have existed for millennia. Examples are mentioned in the Bible, and by
Thucydides. Rome committed genocide against Carthage
in 146 BC. Crusaders perpetrated genocidal massacres
against Jews in Europe and against Arabs and Jews in
Palestine. Mongols committed genocide against several
thriving cities in the thirteenth century. In the fifteenth,
Vietnam perpetrated genocide against the neighbouring
kingdom of Champa. In the sixteenth century Spaniards
did so in Hispaniola, as did Japanese invading forces
in Korea.
Though the term “genocide” did not yet exist, the concept
and the acts did, and other terms served. In 1574 England’s
Earl of Essex drew up a plan for Ulster, to ensure that “the
Rebell shalbe utterlie extirped.” O’Neill resistance, Essex
wrote to London, demanded war “to expulse him, and utterlie to roote him out, or else so to weaken him by takinge
awaie his dependanntes.” To achieve that, Essex’s troops
surprised several hundred Clandeboye O’Neills at a
Christmas feast, and slaughtered them. Essex sent London
an unconvincing denial: “I never mente to unpeople the
Cuntrie Clandyboy of their naturall inhabitanntes.” But
he had.
Soon afterwards in the southern Irish province of Munster,
an English officer wrote of “pitifull murther, for man,
woman and child were put to the sworde.” Captain William
Pelham recorded how in 1580, “We…executed the people
wherever we found them.” The Earl of Ormond reported
putting to the sword “about 4000 common people caught
in cabin and field.” The Irish Annals of the Four Masters
recorded that “they killed blind and feeble men, women,
boys and girls, sick persons, idiots and old people”.
Edmund Spenser described how English forces then
starved Munster by preventing people from farming. “Out
of every corner of the woods and glynnes they came
creeping forth upon their hands, for their legges could
not beare them; they looked like anatomies of death,
they spake like ghosts crying out of their graves;…that
in a short space there were none almost left, and a most
populous and plentifull countrey suddainely left voyde
of man and beast.” Lord Burghley said that Munster had
been “dispeopled.”

As European colonialism expanded across the world and
settlers took up new lands from indigenous peoples, they
provoked local resistance, and genocide was sometimes
the result. Almost the entire continents of North America,
Australia, and Africa were conquered by American and
European empires in the nineteenth century alone. Genocides occurred on all three continents.
By 1900, the world had become smaller, the great powers
greater, and contests for territory closely fought. A new
phenomenon emerged: genocides perpetrated by dictatorships that had seized control of tottering, shrinking, or
new empires, aiming to reverse territorial losses or conquer new regions from established powers.

no longer needed to exist near us.” And, the statement
went on, “Let’s reduce the U.S. mainland into ashes and
darkness.” North Korea and the United States are both
signatories to the Genocide Convention. In Trump’s case
it was unprecedented for a leader of a state that has
signed it to mount a U.N. platform, as he did in the General
Assembly last year, and flout this core component of
international criminal law. The UN Security Council,
of which the United States is a member, is charged with
implementing the Convention, and Trump’s threats of genocide, even if not carried out, only weakened its mandate.

In 2017 the fate of the Rohingyas in Burma, or Myanmar,
became the most pressing current case of ethnic cleansing. In September, the UN High Commissioner for Human
The twentieth century offered mass murderers new tech- Rights called their mistreatment a “textbook example” of
nological, political, or organizational opportunities. Large- ethnic cleansing. UN Secretary-General António Guterres
scale armaments production, telegraph communications,
added: “When one third of the Rohingya population had
widespread civilian enlistment into military organizations, to flee the country, can you find a better word to describe
and rapid mass transportation by land and sea all facilit?” By the end of 2017, about 700,000 Rohingyas had fled
itated projects as ambitious and extensive as genocide.
into Bangladesh.
The advent of “total war” and totalitarianism now offered
prospective genocidists not only cover and ideological
A Muslim minority of approximately 1.4 million in a largely
rationales for their crimes but unprecedented efficiency. Buddhist country, Rohingyas have lived in the Arakan
region of what is now Burma since the 15th century or earGreater population pressure on the land also increased
lier. In 1799, the British scholar Francis Buchanan wrote
the numbers of potential victims. The estimated worldof the Rohingya people as “long settled in Arakan.” He
wide population, which doubled to nearly 1 billion from
mentioned “three dialects, spoken in the Burma Empire,
1500 to 1800, almost doubled again in the nineteenth
but evidently derived from the language of the Hindu
century, to around 1.75 billion people by 1910. Land
nation.” One was “that spoken by the Mohammedans,
became scarcer, and human resources in less demand.
who have long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves
For expansionist regimes, mass killing now presented
Rooinga, or natives of Arakan.”¹
potentially greater benefits with less risk of labor shortages. For new twentieth-century totalitarian party-states
When British colonial rule ended in 1948, the Rohingyas
propounding race or class ideologies, entire groups of
became citizens of a democratic, independent Union of
people became inimical or expendable. While the Nazis
Burma. But the Burmese army seized power there in 1962,
pursued their racial victims and territorial conquests,
and deprived Rohingyas of their citizenship in 1982. Meanthe Communist giants, Stalin’s USSR and Mao’s China,
while military abuses and pressure on them only increased.
pursued mass killing of domestic political enemies and
social “classes.”
In 1978, more than 200,000 Rohingyas fled into Bangladesh
from their homes in Burma’s Rakhine (Arakan) State. From
During the Cold War that followed the Nazis’ defeat, polit- late 1991 to mid-1992, another 250,000 Rohingya refugees
ical massacres and genocides occurred on both sides. In
crossed the border. Burmese military personnel had
1965–66, the U.S.-backed Indonesian army supervised the
reportedly warned two women who arrived in Bangladesh
murder of half a million or more communists and alleged in January 1994 that they should leave the country. “Why
communists, and then went on a decade later to invade
are you staying here?,” they asked one of the women,
East Timor and kill another hundred thousand people in
who was “specifically told by the military that she would
what a UN-sponsored Truth Commission called “extermi- be beaten by the military personnel.”²
nation as a crime against humanity.” In 1971 the Pakistani
military conducted a genocide in Bangladesh, and in 1975 The oppression continued, provoking resistance, and escaPol Pot’s Cambodian Communist Party took power and
lated into the current crisis after the 2015 elections brought
subjected Cambodia to a genocide that ended 1.7 million
into government the longtime political prisoner Aung San
lives in four years. The Guatemalan military regime comSuu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD). On
mitted genocide against ethnic Mayan Indians in 1981–83. October 9, 2016, “Rohingya men and boys armed mostly
with sticks and knives attacked three police outposts,
Throughout this Cold War period, the 1948 Genocide
reportedly killing nine police.” In a massive overreaction,
Convention was never enforced. The United States did not the Myanmar Army led attacks “on Rohingya civilians in
even ratify the Convention until 1988.
approximately 40 villages in Maungdaw Township, displacing more than 94,000 civilians.”³
The end of the Cold War saw no reduction in the occurrence of genocides, but it finally ushered in the first
On August 25, 2017, a small Rohingya insurgent group, the
enforcement of the Genocide Convention. War crimes
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked military
committed in Bosnia provoked the UN Security Council
posts. The army, now alleging that the insurgents were
to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the
affiliated with the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), escalated
Former Yugoslavia to try perpetrators like Ratko Mladic.
its attacks on Rohingyas as a group. Commentator John
Then the 1994 Rwandan genocide of the country’s Tutsi
Pennington noted that ARSA’s predecessor organization,
minority, in three months the fastest episode of mass
The Faith Movement, “was launched in 2012 by exiled
killing since the Holocaust, obliged the UN to set up ano- Rohingyas in Saudi Arabia,” but that “there is no evidence
ther tribunal for Rwanda. In 1998, the former mayor of
suggesting ARSA and ISIS have joined forces.”⁴
Kigali became the first person to be convicted of genocide
in an international court, fifty years after the Genocide
In December 2017, the head of the United Nations Human
Convention came into being.
Rights Council, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, took the matter to
another level when he said that “that Myanmar’s secuAs the court found in convicting Mladic last year, the
rity forces may be guilty of committing genocide.” On
massacre of Bosnian Muslim men at Srebrenica in 1995
February 1, 2018, the Associated Press published detailed
fit the international legal definition of genocide. To “totally evidence of five mass graves of Rohingya victims of “sysdestroy North Korea,” a country of 25 million people, as
tematic slaughter.”⁵
Donald Trump threatened to do in 2017, would also be to
commit genocide. The same applies to the threats of Kim The U.N. special envoy on human rights in Myanmar,
Jong-un’s North Korean regime, which asserted: “The four
Yanghee Lee, concurred that the Myanmar army’s vioislands of the [Japanese] archipelago should be sunken
lence against Rohingya Muslims bears “the hallmarks of
into the sea by the nuclear bomb,” adding that “Japan is
a genocide.” Lee told reporters that she couldn’t make
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a definitive declaration about genocide until a credible
international tribunal or court had weighed the evidence,
but “we are seeing signs and it is building up to that.” She
described her recent visit to refugee camps in Bangladesh
and other areas in the region to discuss the Rohingya
crisis. The government of Myanmar refused her entrance
to the country.
Yanghee Lee added that “we’ve called for a fact finding
mission…and access for international media” to the areas
in northern Rakhine state where the Rohingya live. Lee
said that Myanmar’s actions were “amounting to crimes
against humanity.” “These are part of the hallmarks of a
genocide,” she said. “I think Myanmar needs to get rid of
this baggage of ‘did you or did you not,’ and if proven that
they did, then there has to be responsibility and accountability. No stones must be left unturned because the
people, the victims, the families of the victims definitely
deserve an answer,” she went on.⁶
Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, head of the UN Human Rights
Council, reiterated this accusation more strongly on
March 7, when he warned that the brutal treatment of
Rohingya Muslims by the government of Myanmar since
August 2017 may be classified as “acts of genocide.”⁷ He
told the Human Rights Council of the bulldozing of mass
graves in what he considers a “deliberate attempt by the
authorities to destroy evidence of potential international
crimes, including possible crimes against humanity.”
After decades of military violence against them, and the
NLD’s silent neglect, it is perhaps predictable that ISIS
might find some sympathizers among the hundreds of
thousands of Rohingya refugees. Targeting all Rohingya,
however, is ethnic cleansing or genocide, an international crime. China aids the Burmese regime and shields
it from UN Security Council action, while the Burmese
military, backed by Aung San Suu Kyi, has continued to
block a UN inquiry commission.⁸
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In the absence of an official UN commission, over a 21month period the non-government organization Fortify
Rights gathered testimony from 254 survivors, officials
and aid workers. On July 19, 2018, it released a 162page report entitled “They Gave Them Long Swords”:
Preparations for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity
Against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, Myanmar.
This report documented “eight crimes against humanity—murder, extermination, rape, deportation or forcible
transfer, torture, imprisonment, enforced disappearance,
and persecution—as well as three acts of genocide committed with a special intent to destroy the Rohingya in
whole or in part.”⁹
Importantly, the report also documented the preparations,
which began after the attacks of October 2016, for these
crimes. According to Fortify Rights, from that date “the
Myanmar military and civilian authorities: 1) “disarmed”
Rohingya civilians, systematically collecting sharp or blunt
objects from Rohingya civilian homes; 2) systematically
tore down fencing and other structures around Rohingya
homes, providing the military with a greater line-of-sight
on civilians; 3) trained and armed local non-Rohingya
citizens in northern Rakhine State; 4) deprived Rohingya
civilians of food and other aid, systematically weakening
them physically; 5) built up state security forces in northern Rakhine State to unnecessary levels;” and imposed
discriminatory curfews against Rohingya civilians.¹⁰
The 2017 crimes against humanity and genocide were
perpetrated by at least 27 army combat battalions composed of 11,000 troops and 900 members of three police
combat battalions.¹¹
Fortify Rights also reported that in both 2016 and 2017, “a
large number of soldiers acting under military control”
committed crimes in northern Rakhine State without interruption over many months, “in a similar fashion throughout multiple locations.” In some cases, “Myanmar Army
commanders were physically present while assemblages
of soldiers raped and gang-raped women and girls, fatally
shot and cut the throats of men, women, and children,

and burned people to death, including infant children. Eyewitness testimony shows that in multiple locations and
on similar timelines, Myanmar Army soldiers massacred
large numbers of civilians and discarded their bodies
in mass graves or burned piles of bodies, all in the presence of large numbers of soldiers. The fact that different
bands of soldiers performed these same actions repeatedly and across disparate locations further suggests knowledge by commanders of the crimes.”¹²
The genocidal persecution of the Rohingyas and the purported appearance of ISIS in Burma are symptoms of the
challenges the international community faces. The 2003
US/UK invasion of Iraq, based on the false premise of
Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and conducted without UN support, spawned an international
insurgency that transformed into ISIS. It seized territory
in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. It conducted genocide against
Yazidis in Iraq, ethnic cleansing against Shia Muslims and
Arab Christians, and war crimes against Kurdish, Iraqi
and Syrian forces. Now losing ground in the Middle East,
ISIS is active in Southeast Asia. Its fearful reputation,
and the apparently false report of its activity in Myanmar
have only fuelled the violent Islamophobia of the Burmese
military and Rakhine Buddhist activists, and sparked off
the region’s worst episode of ethnic cleansing and quite
possibly genocide since Pol Pot’s genocide of ethnic
Vietnamese and Cham Muslims in the late 1970s.
While the Myanmar military was carrying out criminal
acts against the Rohingya people in 2017, Donald Trump
was threatening to “totally destroy” North Korea, and
China blocked any UN investigation into the plight of the
Rohingyas. The great powers must reform their reckless
rhetoric and dangerous policies, and set to work to tackle
this continuing international tragedy. The United States
and China should cooperate with the UN to end genocide.

1 Francis Buchanan, “A Comparative Vocabulary of Some of the
Languages Spoken in the Burma Empire,” Asiatic Researches
5 (1799): 219–240, reprinted in SOAS Bulletin of Burma
Research, Vol. 1, No., 1, 2003, www.soas.ac.uk/sbbr/editions/
file64276.pdf, p. 55.

10 Ibid., p. 41.

2 U.S. Committee for Refugees, The Return of the Rohingya
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Issue Paper, Washington, D.C., 1995, pp. 1, 3, 13.

11 Ibid., pp. 14, 115, 131; see also Hannah Beech, “Myanmar
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10/what-are-the-links-between-the-rakhine-crisis-and-isis.
5 “AP finds mass graves, latest evidence of Rohingya genocide
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www.cbsnews.com/news/myanmar-mass-graves-latestrohingya-slaughter-genocide-ap.
6 “UN says Myanmar’s treatment of Rohingya Muslims has the
‘hallmarks of genocide’”, Business Insider, Associated Press,
February 1, 2018, www.businessinsider.com/un-saysmyanmars-treatment-of-rohingya-muslims-has-the-hallmarksof-genocide-2018-2.
7 Stephanie Nebehay and Simon Lewis, “‘Acts of genocide’
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March 7, 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingyarights/acts-of-genocide-suspected-against-rohingya-inmyanmar-u-n-idUSKCN1GJ163.

8 “They Gave Them Long Swords,” p. 40.
9 Ibid., p. 13.
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AT
OXENHOLME
RAILWAY
STATION

The train, the hour—late, late late.
Sipping warm lemonade from a glass bottle,
I stare at the men who have been drinking since ten this morning.
An old tradition, they say: this stumbling along the yellow stripes
of the platform, this laughter at the mention of green fairies
near the lakes,
spots of strange color. I must turn away.
Earlier, I was busy
dropping gingerbread crumbs on William
and Dorothy’s graves, fumbling
for an umbrella in the light rain. In Keswick
artists had set up shop at a little church
that smelled of strong perfume. “Poetry,”
one was called. I dabbed a little on my wrists. The scent
comes home on my jacket sleeves.
It was hard to resist collecting the portraits
of sheep, posed like a close family, in lovely Ambleside,
and at a leather and fur store I ran my fingers
through coarse Herdwick wool.
In Grasmere I bought a postcard for fifty pence in loose change
and told myself I was doing it right. It was also right
to tour Dove Cottage at half past two, before the rain got too bad,
but it might have been more right to go at three
when the bird in his cuckoo clock came out. Wordsworth,
the guide announced, loved that clock. Loves? He
is the Lake District’s great son, still. They are rather proud,
the three drunk men. One of them borrows
my multicolored pen to write his email on an old football ticket.
The scrawled letters run together on the damp paper.
His friend lights a cigarette in the grey drizzle. The train pulls
into the station.
I am a face in the window with eyes fixed north.
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the American Plan included John D. Rockefeller, Jr., who
funded the Plan at the federal level; Eliot Ness, who ran
the federal agency that oversaw the American Plan during
WWII; Earl Warren, as state attorney general and then
governor of California. Eleanor Roosevelt was complicit.
Her husband Franklin was complicit. Dwight D. Eisenhower
was a big fan. Fiorello La Guardia was a big fan. People in
every level of government and every branch of government were complicit, if not active fans. There were very
few voices of dissent within the government and very few
voices of dissent without the government—with the exception of a handful of committed activists, reformers, and
journalists, and the incarcerated women themselves.

B: DID THE AVERAGE AMERICAN KNOW ABOUT THE PLAN?
S: That’s a complicated question. Sexually transmitted
infections were incredibly stigmatized in the early- to
mid-twentieth century. The surgeon general himself was
not allowed to say the word syphilis on the radio in 1934.
It was hard to write about in the newspaper. People did,
they just did so with euphemism. Most people were aware
what was going on. There are a lot of records of government agents writing to each other about what people on
the street were talking about. Certainly, the women who
were behind bars had their free speech curtailed. But
this was something that was, at the time, widely known.

B: THE TRIALS OF NINA MCCALL IS FILLED WITH THE MANY
WAYS WOMEN FOUGHT BACK AGAINST THE AMERICAN PLAN.
WHO WERE THESE WOMEN, AND WHAT DID THEIR RESISTANCE
LOOK LIKE?

Between World War I and 1980, tens of thousands of
American women were arrested without due process and
quarantined on the suspicion that they were prostitutes,
sexually promiscuous, or carried a sexually transmitted
infection. The program to incarcerate suspicious women,
which had support in every state and at every level of the
federal government, was known as the “American Plan.” It
is the subject of Scott W. Stern’s recent book, The Trials
Of Nina McCall (Beacon Press, 2018). Stern, who is in his
second year at Yale Law School, began researching the
American Plan as an undergraduate at Yale College. He
spoke with BRINK about the American Plan and the ways
its victims resisted persecution. Below is an edited and
condensed transcript of the interview.

BRINK: WHAT WAS THE AMERICAN PLAN?
STERN: The American Plan was the system under which
U.S. government officials locked up tens, probably hundreds of thousands of women without due process in
what were essentially concentration camps. They did this
because they suspected the women had sexually transmitted infections, syphilis or gonorrhea, or because
they suspected the women were prostitutes, or they simply suspected that the women were promiscuous. This
started in World War I, and it was justified as protecting
the national security by protecting soldiers from wayward
women who were going to infect them with STIs. But it
wasn’t entirely justified by that because the Plan continued for decades after WWI. It continued through WWII
into the fifties, and in some places into the sixties and
seventies. All of the laws that enabled the American Plan
remain on the books to this day.

B: WHO IN GOVERNMENT KNEW ABOUT THIS? HOW FAR UP
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND DID THE AMERICAN PLAN GO?
S: Everyone knew, from the president of the United States
on down. This was in large part funded at the federal level
by Woodrow Wilson, in a sense personally. He dispersed
money from what was basically a WWI-era presidential
slush fund in order to construct federally funded detention facilities for women. People who played a role in

S: As a rule, they were lower-income, they were disproportionately women of color, and they were women who were
perceived by men and women in power as sexually promiscuous. But at the time that could mean so many things.
It could be a woman out on a date with a man, a woman
seen walking alone, a woman sitting in a restaurant alone,
a woman drinking alcohol. All of those women were
suspicious enough to get detained, forcibly examined for
an STI and, if she tested positive, incarcerated without
due process.
The prostitutes themselves began conducting a series
of highly rigorous studies to document that they were
not, in fact, common vectors of infection. The reason for
that is pretty simple: the rate of female-to-male vaginal
transmission is very low. And they conducted a number
of studies to prove that. These studies were published
in The Lancet, in the Journal of the American Medical
Association. Women from [the rights organization Call
Off Your Old Tired Ethics] COYOTE and other organizations testified before state legislatures in order to push
back against proposals that they be mass-tested or quarantined. That has largely been forgotten.
What’s also largely been forgotten is the role in this of
Robert Redfield, President Trump’s Director of the Center
for Disease Control. In 1984, Robert Redfield, who was
a physician at Walter Reed Naval Hospital, released a
study that he had done on some 41 soldiers. He found that
a large number of soldiers infected with HIV had been
infected by female prostitutes. A number of people at the
time pointed out that this was probably inaccurate, because
the studies relied on men reporting this themselves. And
of course these men were not going to report that they
had been injecting drugs or sleeping with other men. But
this study was widely publicized and it launched calls
across the nation for the quarantining of prostitutes.
Robert Redfield later oversaw the mass testing of military recruits, which led anyone trying to get into the
military who tested positive to be barred from the military.
Those already in the military were isolated in treatment
wards that some called leper colonies. It led at least one
soldier to try and kill himself.
For the American Plan’s entire existence, from the 1910s
up through the sixties and seventies, women fought back
vigorously. It’s impossible to say with any exactness, but
hundreds if not thousands of women escaped from their
detention facilities. Hundreds if not thousands of women
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rioted, physically fought back against their captors. A
huge number of their detention facilities caught fire and
a number of fires, we know, were set by the female inmates
themselves. There are records of women holding hunger
strikes. There are records of women speaking out in the
press. I found the record of a woman who leapt from a
moving train rather than go to one of these detention facilities. I found the record of a woman jumping out of a
window to her death rather than remain in a detention
facility. Women resisted in so many ways.
Another common method of resistance involved suing
the government. This at a time when it was very difficult
for stigmatized women to get access to counsel and then
to have their case heard in court. Still, a lot of women
sued the government, and we know this because of the
number of cases that reached appellate courts. We also
know that the government tried very hard to suppress
these lawsuits. Federal agents put a ton of pressure on
the American Bar Association to in turn put pressure
on its lawyers not to represent these women. And, in some
cases, the ABA did that. Federal agents also put pressure
on judges not to go easy on these women. Nonetheless,
women continued to sue and in a couple cases won. Still,
the laws themselves were never overturned.

B: HOW DID THE AMERICAN PLAN END?
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S: The American Plan operated on a local level for most
of its history. Every state and hundreds of cities across
the country passed laws enabling local officials to detain,
examine, and incarcerate women. The Plan ended in
various places in different times. In some places we can
pinpoint an exact moment when it ended. In other places
it just faded out. This happened in the fifties, in the sixties, and in the seventies. In San Francisco, into the
mid-1970s officials continued to detain and hold women
without due process for 72 hours and examine them for
STIs. They had been ordered to stop doing this in the late
forties, but officials just didn’t comply. The Plan really
ended in San Francisco because of the rise of the Sex
Workers’ Rights Movement. There was an organization
called Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics, COYOTE, which
was founded by a remarkable woman named Margo St.
James, who is still alive, that advocated for the decriminalization of sex work and prostitution. It advocated for
their voice in medicine and in the political process, and
it was largely motivated in the early days by the lingering
remnants of the American Plan. COYOTE launched protests, did their own investigations, and eventually they
partnered with the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union]
to sue Alameda County and they won. In one jurisdiction, the judge said that if they wanted to enforce these
American Plan laws, they’d have to enforce them equally
against men and women, and so of course male officials
stopped enforcing it. This betrayed the fundamental sexism of the program.

B: WHAT HAPPENED IN THE 1980S WITH HIV/AIDS VIS-À-VIS
THE AMERICAN PLAN?
S: It’s important to remember that all of the American Plan
laws remain on the books in some form to this day. In the
early eighties, when the epidemic broke out, there were
surprisingly few calls for quarantine. That was because
people thought AIDS was something only a couple populations could get—gay men, Haitians, IV drug users, and
hemophiliacs, the so-called Four-H’s. But a couple explosive media incidents happened in 1984 and 1985—including the death of Rock Hudson, and the widely publicized
arrest of a sex worker in New Haven, Connecticut—that
led the general population to believe that they too were at
risk, that straight people too might get this. That launched
in mid-1985 a state of incredibly punitive attempts to
police those with AIDS or those suspected of having AIDS,
especially prostitutes and sex workers. And officials
repeatedly said, “we have these laws on the books from
the American Plan, maybe we should use them again.”
And so you saw dozens of states across the country consider quarantining people on a large scale. Polls suggested

that huge numbers of Americans supported that. Many
states specifically added AIDS to the list of conditions
that could be quarantined. And there were a handful of
cases of quarantine across the country, mostly of sex workers. Thankfully, it was not put in place on any broad scale—
in part because of the activism of sex workers and people with AIDS themselves, who launched protests and did
their own studies and who in very real ways fought back.

B: THE OFFICIALS IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN CITED CONCERNS
OVER PUBLIC HEALTH. HOW CREDIBLE DO YOU THINK THOSE
CLAIMS WERE?
S: For much of the twentieth century—before the advent
of sulfa drugs and penicillin—STIs did run rampant. Huge
percentages of people had syphilis or gonorrhea. They
were difficult to treat and they were unpleasant. There
is reason to believe that syphilis and gonorrhea were
among the largest causes of disability that the American
army suffered during WWI and around that time.
That said, this program made no sense at all from a public
health standpoint. For one, if you’re going to quarantine
people to prevent a transmissible infection, it doesn’t
make sense to quarantine just half the public—that is,
women but no men. There were a couple men incarcerated
under the plan, but very few. It’s not a sensible approach
to public health. Rather, it’s a means of controlling women.
Second, the ostensible reason they were incarcerating
women was to treat them for STIs. But they did not have
effective treatments back then. The most common treatment at the time was an injection of mercury. Another
common treatment was an injection of arsenic-based
drugs. These things did very little to cure you of your infection. They did, however, hurt tremendously, and caused
all kinds of terrible, painful side effects. And, if continued
long enough, they could kill you.
It’s also important to remember that the diagnostic mechanisms for syphilis and gonorrhea were very flawed at
the time. There’s reason to believe that the Wasserman
examination, which was the most common blood test for
syphilis at the time, could have a false positive rate up
to 25 percent. The test for gonorrhea involved the visual
inspection of microscopic slides, which was notoriously
unreliable. So again, from a public health standpoint, this
just doesn’t make sense.

B: BUT DID PEOPLE THINK THAT AT THE TIME? AS YOU CITE,
THERE WERE MANY STUDIES SHOWING, WE NOW KNOW
ERRONEOUSLY, THAT 90 PERCENT OF SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED
INFECTIONS WERE TRANSMITTED BY PROSTITUTES.
S: Those studies were based on flawed science, and there
are a number of scholars who have demonstrated that.
People were not aware generally that the diagnostic techniques were really pretty unreliable. That was not widely
known. The limitations on the medical treatment were
fairly well known. And it’s important not to look back at
historical actors like physicians and think, “Boy, people
used to be so stupid.” That’s not a sensible approach
to the history of medicine; it’s not a sensible approach to
history. But people were generally aware that there were
extreme limitations to what they could accomplish with
these medical treatments. And there are instances in
which you see people talk about or write about the incarceration of women as a form of punishment and not as a
form of treatment.
There’s an example of a health agent in California saying
to a lawyer, “If I wanted, I could go arrest your wife.” It
was clearly used as a tool of power. It was fundamentally
about controlling women, about controlling infection.

B: IF IT’S UNPRODUCTIVE TO SAY HISTORICAL ACTORS WERE
STUPID, IS IT PRODUCTIVE THEN TO SAY THAT THEY WERE
MISOGYNISTIC, RACIST, CLASSIST?
S: I think the answer is yes. But I think it’s important not
to see them as uniquely or distinctly misogynistic, or

racist, or classist. Because that risks celebrating who we
are right now. In my opinion, our society remains fundamentally sexist and racist and classist. It’s important to
honestly assess people in the past, even people who we
lionize, like Earl Warren or Eleanor Roosevelt, because
it’s important to see these continuities, see how the carceral regime that began in the early twentieth century
has effects to this day, and the philosophy that it cemented
about women persists to this day. We still disproportionately police women who sell sex and arrest the men who
purchase that sex at a much, much lower rate. We still
disproportionately detain women of color for these crimes.
And very importantly, the physical facilities that housed
women under the American Plan in many cases exist to
this day. There are continuities here we should remember.

B: WHAT ABOUT ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, SOMEONE WIDELY
REGARDED AS A CHAMPION OF CIVIL RIGHTS? SHE’S NOT
PORTRAYED FLATTERINGLY IN YOUR BOOK. WHAT ARE WE TO
DO WITH SOMEONE LIKE HER?
S: We should treat Eleanor Roosevelt as someone of her
time, and at her time an elite woman like herself would’ve
had very negative impressions of sexually promiscuous
women, of sexually liberated women. At the same time,
though, Eleanor Roosevelt was a person with agency. She
certainly had the ability to make her own choices and
in this case made profoundly wrong choices. She raised
money for an organization that was integral to the incarceration of thousands of women. She was at meetings at
which federal agents talked about locking up thousands of
women, and she did not object. She was totally aware of
the American Plan and did not speak out, while she was
speaking out about a number of other social ills, a number of other bigoted programs. So while we should not treat
her as some sort of uniquely evil figure, and we should
remember all the good that she did, we should also see her
as having done some less than good things, and see her as
fundamentally a product of her time and place and class,
which is to say a somewhat close-minded person.

B: YOU WRITE THAT THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN PLAN HAS
NOT JUST BEEN FORGOTTEN BUT ACTIVELY BURIED. HOW?
S: First, there’s the intentional suppression of the free
speech of these women. There are a number of cases in
which they were denied access to counsel. Most facilities
that incarcerated these women refused to allow visitors
so they couldn’t tell people what was happening. Their
mail was read, and so they couldn’t write what was truly
happening when they were inside these facilities. In all
those ways, their stories were buried.
Probably more importantly, elite men and women played
a role in the maintenance of a culture that so stigmatized incarceration, sexually transmitted infections, and
sexual promiscuity that women simply weren’t able to
talk about this. It was too stigmatized. They wouldn’t be
able to get jobs if they talked about this. They certainly
wouldn’t be able to find partners if they talked about this.
And newspapers simply wouldn’t print these words in a
lot of cases. In all these ways, their stories have not just
been forgotten but intentionally obscured.

B: YOU DON’T BUY THAT THESE LOCAL ENFORCERS WERE
SIMPLY DOING THEIR JOB AS ORDERED FROM ON HIGH,
THAT THEY WERE FOOT SOLDIERS IN A WAR THAT WASN’T
THEIR MAKING.
S: No, I don’t, because this literally wasn’t coming from
on high. It may have started as a top-down program
during World War I but officials continued to enforce this
from the twenties through the sixites. And they could
have stopped it at any time. But they didn’t, because they
didn’t see anything wrong with this. In fact, officials male
and female believed they were helping these women.
They knew what they were doing, they made choices,
they had agency, of course we should view them as products of their time but it’s also important to view them
as people with the ability to choose. And they chose to

lock thousands of women up in what some women called
concentration camps.

B: HOW DO YOU UNCOVER THIS STORY AND NOT EMERGE
DEEPLY PESSIMISTIC?
S: You do become incredibly pessimistic, and there’s no
escaping that. How would you feel if your sister, or your
mother, or your girlfriend were walking down the street
and were detained, examined in the most personal way
imaginable, and then locked away without a trial, for
months, to be pumped full of poison and then released
and told that she was less-than? How would you feel? It’s
profoundly unfair, and I think everyone can grasp that.
We’ve been taught so many mythologized and sanitized
versions of history that it’s depressing, I think, to read
what actually happened. What uplifts me at the end of the
day is the resistance from the women who were incarcerated. The fact that people fought back against great odds
and in some cases won, and even when they lost continued to fight back, and that people fight back to this day—
that’s what gets me out of bed in the morning.
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I CANNOT
TELL A LIE

political economy—and the political language—that it
can shelter?
Kwame Anthony Appiah’s new book on an old problem of
representation, As If: Idealization and Ideals, could easily
have shared a title with the works of Greenspan and
Houellebecq. Instead, he wisely steers clear of well-trodden
metaphors, even as he embraces and illuminates their
underlying logic. Appiah is concerned with the ubiquity
of “idealization”—proceeding “as if” what we know to be
strictly false were true—in diverse academic disciplines
and realms of human activity. “We need many pictures of
the world to do anything—to do science, to do ethics, to
do politics,” he said in a recent interview. These pictures
are always “going to be imperfect…it’s only useful if it
leaves stuff out.”⁴
Appiah lifts his definition of idealization from the vocabulary of the philosophy of science, and his framework
roughly from the work of Hans Vaihinger, a little-known
Kant scholar who published The Philosophy of ‘As If’ in
1911. Appiah’s argument, at first glance, appears to be
less about substance (it does not aim “to announce any
startling discoveries”) than about relevance: the book
offers itself as an amicable, erudite, and at times hurried
180-page advertisement for the concept of idealization as
a vital topic of research beyond its narrow origins. We
make simplifying assumptions in scientific models or political philosophy, Appiah explains, even though we know
that gases are not colliding point masses, people are not
in full compliance with norms of justice, and nationstates are not fully independent Westphalian sovereigns.
We describe rational agents in economics, even though
we know that real people are not optimal profit-maximizers with perfectly rational expectations. We respond
emotionally to theater, even though we know that no one
really dies. And, Appiah argues, we ascribe identities
of race or sexual orientation to ourselves and to others,
even though we hold that these categories are fictional.

OF ALL OF LEWIS CARROLL’S FANTASTICAL WORLDS, one of
the most enduring and impossible is a simple map. In response to a Victorian traveler’s explanation that the largest
useful scale of a map is about six inches to the mile, one
of his characters exclaims: “Only six inches! We very soon
got to six yards to the mile. Then we tried a hundred yards
to the mile. And then came the grandest idea of all! We
actually made a map of the country, on the scale of a
mile to the mile!” Yet the map remains folded in disuse,
as farmers objected that the map would block the sunlight: “So we now use the country itself, as its own map,
and I assure you it does nearly as well.”¹
The gap Carroll charted between map and territory—between representation and reality—has since become wide
enough to fit a host of enemy ideologies from diverse and
far-flung disciplines. The tattered remains of Carroll’s
one-to-one scale map litter the once-conquered desert,
a disused fantasy of empire in Borges’ “On Exactitude in
Science”; in Baudrillard’s critique of US imperialism, it
is instead the territory “whose shreds are slowly rotting
across the map.”² In the past seven years, Alan Greenspan,
former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and Michel
Houellebecq, author of Submission, published books with
the same title: The Map and the Territory.
Carroll’s articulation of the problem of representation—
the impossibility and uselessness of a perfect representation, the necessity of an imperfect and thus strictly
false map—has had a long afterlife. The image of the map
and the territory occurs so pervasively, in such a wide
variety of contexts, that it can fade into the problem it
seeks to represent, appearing to have no content of its
own. But how is it that the fable of the one-to-one map
has proven so remarkably elastic, accommodating both
critics of imperialism and mourners of empire, free market deregulators and post-Keynesian Marxists,³ abstruse
postmodernists and hard-nosed economists? Why is it
that the map and the territory is how we pose the question
of representation, and what constraints does Carroll’s
formula place on its answers? What are the limits of the

Regardless of their content, idealizations may be justified—and necessary—on the pragmatic grounds that they
are “useful for managing the world, including, sometimes,
ourselves.” We need idealized models in so many fields
not because they are true (they aren’t), but because they
make the world intelligible to us, and equip us with the
cognitive resources to act upon it, where a true representation would be impossible for us or unsuited to our purposes. Appiah reminds the reader again and again that
the question that defines and justifies an idealization is:
“For what purposes is the assumption useful?” Idealizations
are the tools and preconditions of human agency.

AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION, economic idealizations have
increasingly become subject to public scrutiny. From
populist and leftist discourse to behavioral economics
and crisis memoirs like Greenspan’s The Map and the
Territory, critiques of rational choice theory as ideal—or
as plain falsehood—have been in vogue. While its first
and third chapters mostly summarize and reframe existing scholarship, As If presents its most original contributions in the second chapter: an extended, partially
vindicating treatment of the probability theory behind
rational choice, a beloved subject of Appiah’s for over
thirty years.
Subjective preference and probability provide the scaffolding for modern economics. In order to model a utilitymaximizing agent’s free choice under uncertainty, an
economist must be able to calculate and compare her
expected utility of each option. That is, we need to be
able to quantify both the desirability of the possible outcomes of each option to the agent, and the likelihood of
each possible outcome, as assessed by the agent.
Engaging closely with Frank Ramsey’s early twentieth century formalization of rational choice theory, Appiah convincingly argues that all attempts to render subjective
probability and preference calculable rest on idealization: clearly, actual agents are not capable of these instan-
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taneous, perfect logical calculations. In order to determine
how the “content” of our beliefs—our actual preferences
and probabilities—affects our actions, we must idealize
away our actual cognitive capacities and constraints. But
a single rational agent could never come to hold all of our
inconsistent preferences and probabilities in the first
place, so we must have some way of reconciling a necessary multiplicity of idealizations into the action of a single
agent. In order to understand actual agents, we need a
second step that, idealizing away from content, explains
how the form of our beliefs—our deviations from “logical
omniscience”—affects our actions.

impossible. By uncertainty, Keynes did not mean “risky”
games of roulette, life expectancy, and (to some extent)
the weather—phenomena that are not certain but merely
probable. Uncertainty instead refers to “the prospect of a
European war…or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new
invention, or the position of private wealth owners in the
social system in 1970.” Major political upheavals, future
conditions of exchange, changes in the means of production, and outcomes of the class struggle are all incalculable, hence unknowable, hence possible—and realizable in
action, for it is precisely “human decisions affecting the
future, whether personal or political or economic, [that]
cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation, since
the basis for making such calculations does not exist.”⁷

Two successive theories, Appiah argues, are necessary to
understand agency: one conditional upon the assumption
that agents perfectly adhere to certain norms, and then
one conditional upon the assumption that agents do not.
Nevertheless, “the necessity for action and for decision”
But, Appiah implies, dual theories of normativity and error in the market compels Keynesian economic actors to act
characterize more than just the market:
“exactly as if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective advantages and disadWhat we see here is the intimate connection between
vantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability,
the description of a person or community as recognizing waiting to be summed.” Instead, economic actors 1) largely
certain norms—a description that might be offered from ignore future uncertainty, assuming that the present is a
the perspective of an outsider—and the understanding
better guide to the future than they know it to be; 2) asof those norms from the perspective of the member of
sume that the present state of opinion, expressed in prices
the community from the point of view of the insider…
and output, correctly sums up future prospects; and so
To see this is to see that an agent is not simply a thing 3) fall back on the communal or conventional judgment
that conforms, more or less inadequately, to the conof the market. Expectation under uncertainty is a social
straints of rationality that decision theory represents,
relation, explicitly mediated by the normative community
but also a person who recognizes, however imperfectly,
Appiah posits as central to the construction of agency.
those constraints as rationally binding.
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Moreover, in Keynes, it is the constitutive nature of error—
It is not a coincidence that so many of the idealizations
the impossibility of perfect rationality—to economic
that populate As If “characterize the norms, conformity
agency that subtends the crisis potential of capitalism:
to which constitutes someone, for our community, as what “a practical theory of future based on these principles…is
we call ‘an agent’”: intentional minds, economic actors,
subject to sudden and violent changes. The practice of
sovereign nation-states, racialized and sexual persons.
calmness and immobility, of certainty and security, sudIdealizations are the cognitive prerequisites for our indidenly breaks down.”⁸
vidual action on the world, but they also bear our communal definitions of who counts as an agent.
As If instructs us that while we need idealized theories to
understand and act upon the world, our theories and our
But, Appiah suggests, we identify and constitute agents
communities define their agents where they leave open
not only by our idealizations—the norms to which our
the possibility of non-ideality, the necessary deviation
agents ought conform—but by the gap between idealizafrom normativity. For Keynes, this is in the figure of the
tion and reality, norms and conformance, map and terinvestor, the actor who makes choices about the allocaritory. Appiah’s framework locates theoretical agency in
tion of capital when adherence to rational calculability is
error, imperfect rationality, and normative deviance.
impossible.⁹ For Marx, this is the proletariat, the subject
of history and manifestation of agency.

TO ERR, IS, AFTER ALL, HUMAN, but Appiah’s account of the
interplay between agency, normativity, and error opens
fascinating views of economic theory that, unfortunately,
he leaves largely unexplored.⁵ As If lacks an explicit
articulation of the theoretical complement to Ramsey’s
idealization of perfect rationality: Appiah argues that
such a theory, which would idealize away the content of
economic agents’ beliefs and preferences to explain the
causal powers of their deviations from rationality, is necessary, but fails to himself supply it.
Historically, this theory was produced by Ramsey’s colleague and friend, John Maynard Keynes. Ramsey had
originally formulated his theory of probability in response
to Keynes’ Treatise on Probability, and Keynes’ magnum
opus, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money, in turn places at its textual and theoretical center
a theory of how economic agents recognize but deviate
from normative rationality. Of orthodox economics,
Keynes writes:
At any given time facts and expectations were assumed
to be given in a definite and calculable form; and risks,
of which, tho admitted, not much notice was taken, were
supposed to be capable of an exact actuarial computation. The calculus of probability, tho mention of it was
kept in the background, was supposed to be capable of
reducing uncertainty to the same calculable status as
that of certainty itself.⁶

However, Keynes continues, the full assimilation of uncertainty to the structure of rational calculation is logically

The reason why we care about who gets to count as an
economic agent isn’t that we have an abstract commitment to a visibility politics of the oppressed. What really
matters is that economic theory has an exhortative function; the erring capitalists and workers of Keynes and
Marx are not just theoretical agents, but the intended
audience for the General Theory and Capital’s calls to
political action. Marx, of course, ultimately addresses
his writing to the proletariat. Keynes, meanwhile, directs
the Concluding Notes to his General Theory to “practical
men…civil servants and politicians and even agitators”
who might enact his prescriptions of countercyclical deficit spending and stock market reforms (the “euthanasia
of the rentier”).¹⁰
However, As If fails to address a reader. Appiah is “interested in the role of untruth in thinking about reality, not
in the usefulness of speaking untruths.” The distinction
he intends is one between cases where the idealizer knows
that what they are thinking is false and cases in which
they are deceived, the difference between the necessity
of idealization and the expediency of deception. But all
communication is not deceit: As If leaves open the urgent
question of what we talk about—and whom we talk to—
when we talk about ideals.
The norms that structure who counts as an agent are undeniably political—questions of personhood, disenfranchisement, and citizenship, in their broadest senses, which
are expressed and negotiated in political discourse,
institutional structures, material deprivation, and violent
exclusion. As languages of agency, idealization and political discourse alike are languages of counterfactuals:

they express what is not, but might be. “It’s only because
observed the corrosive drift of language around him:
we can understand what it would be for the world to be
“The Third Reich coined only a very small number of words
different from the way it is,” Appiah writes, “only because in its language, perhaps—indeed probably—none at all.
we have epistemic access to possible worlds, if you like— But it changes the values of words and the frequency of
that we can build idealizations.”
their occurrence…and in the process steeps words and
groups of words and sentence structures with its poison.”¹¹
But politics is concerned not with false antecedents but
Commentators are self-righteously attentive to the pertheir possible consequents. The untruths we tell about
versions of language foisted on us by the Trump adminisactuality matter less than the possibilities—and the actions tration, as if truth were a buoy to cling to. But in doing so,
necessary to achieve them—that they illuminate in our
we have swapped out the political agents of our language
political futures. Debates in politics, unlike in political
and our economic theories for jurors, leaving only the
philosophy or academic economics, are not usually fought incredulous epistemic possibility of a fact-finder. Is it
over alternate modeling assumptions. Conversely, the invo- possible that the inauguration audience was the largcation of modeling assumptions in political discourse
est ever? Is it possible that the wall can be built in a year?
serves not as an opening of a conversation about economic Is it possible that Uber will provide living wages? Is it
theory, but as an implied commitment to political action. possible that tariffs will bring back manufacturing jobs?
Yet Appiah equivocates between these two senses of possibility, between what is a possible (but false) modeling
assumption, and what is politically possible or attainable
(but not yet realized) given our assumptions:
The questions are often complex, empirical, social
scientific questions about human possibility: what
changes … is it feasible to bring about, given the way
people are psychologically, given the social structures
in which they are embedded? But in all these domains,
in taking something false for true, we are engaging in
what is, at least from one angle, our most astonishing
human capacity: the ability to access ways the world is
not but might have been.

The problem behind Appiah’s equivocation is not just linguistic—we only have one word for possibility—but logical:
expanding the boundaries of what is possible in our model
will determine what we see as possible in our political
futures, while stating a political possibility will necessarily
carry with it an implicit idealized model. Speaking one
untruth precludes speaking the other.

But the point of articulating an untruth in politics is not
whether we believe it, but about what its effect is when
spoken—who the audience is, and what possibilities they
are urged to enact. Unlike Keynes and Marx, whose theories ascribe theoretical agency to and demand political
action from their audience, Trump’s untruths—to the extent
that they can be constituted as a “theory”—address the
working and middle classes, even as his policies are aimed
to benefit the elite.
The language of political possibility is fragile, elusive in
the best of times. It can sound wonkish, uncertain, or
gullible. But at its most rhetorically powerful, programmatic usage slips into another modal category: necessity.
We speak untruths to compel action, and to compel it now:
saying another world is possible means we need another
world. As an accidental cartography of the truth and
untruth that occupy our political attention, As If can help
us understand how to recover a language of urgency in
the possibilities that are left to us. Any political possibility rests on a false representation of its subject, and
Appiah is right to emphasize that shifting our normative

IDEALIZATION AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE
ALIKE ARE LANGUAGES OF COUNTERFACTUALS:
THEY EXPRESS WHAT IS NOT, BUT MIGHT BE.
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE POLITICAL LANGUAGE OF POSSIBILITY
in As If is happening today. Appiah notes that “our unhappy
proliferation of ‘alternative facts’ is not what Vaihinger”—
or Appiah—“had in mind” in their thinking about useful
untruths and idealizations. Nevertheless, As If’s language
for describing idealization characterizes the language of
the current moment: a strong notion of brute truth, a focus
on identifying and adjudicating untruths. Alternative facts,
fake news, post-truth politics; the words of our vigilance
are drenched in truth, and the limits and aims of our
political language have shifted accordingly. Our preoccupation with truth, intended as a safeguard against
Trump’s linguistic rot, has led inadvertently to a different
sort of decay: the hollowing out of a political language of
possibility, and of the awareness of the rhetorical functions of idealization.
The pure possibility that has long characterized political
rhetoric, both mainstream and radical—Yes We Can, A
Future to Believe In, Another World is Possible—now
sounds tone deaf. This is not about optimism. It is undeniable that material realities in the current political moment
have reduced what appears as immediately possible;
what’s happening to political language reflects (and does
not cause) what’s happening to politics, and to the most
marginalized.
But something nonetheless changes in the political language of possibility when politics becomes about hard
truths and untruths. In the Language of the Third Reich,
the Jewish-turned-Protestant philologist Victor Klemperer

constructions of agents in a community is what shifts the
boundaries of the possible. We see this in movements for
immigrants’ rights: the contestation of citizenship and
community, “no borders, no walls” as possibility and as
demand. We see it, too, in courtroom and workplace battles over what counts as work and who counts as a worker
in an economy increasingly defined by subcontracting,
the “gig economy,” and other structures both hostile to
labor organizing and outside many worker protection laws.
The limits of As If are the limits of idealization. They are
the limits of a political discourse in which truth evacuates
possibility. Appiah asks of idealizations, “For what purposes…?” We might ask this ourselves. For what purposes
have we made a map of the territory if we don’t know
where we can go?
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tires and kites, and storm the fence constitute a threat to
Israeli security. These activities, according to the Israeli
government, are acts of war and free the military from
the restrictions of human rights law.⁵
On further inspection, these justifications fall flat. While
Hamas has indeed provided financial and organizational
support to the demonstrators, the Great Return March
has been led by a wide coalition of Palestinians from the
beginning, including doctors, lawyers, university students
and academics, civil society organizations, refugees, and
families. Although Hamas has profited politically from
the demonstrations, the movement has never “belonged”
to them. To suggest otherwise, according to Asad Abu
Sharekh, the spokesman for the march, “is Israel’s way to
sabotage the idea of the march in order to justify its
escalation against protesters.”⁶
Neither have protestors posed any significant danger
to Israeli soldiers or civilians. Here, again, the evidence
against the Israeli government is overwhelming: not a
single Israeli has been physically harmed over the past
two months.⁷ And at the very least, if Israeli soldiers are
acting in self-defense, then they should theoretically injure or kill only those who constitute, by the state’s definition, a violent threat. This is especially true in Gaza,
where the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) claims to have acted
with super-human precision: its snipers, according to the
army’s Twitter account, “know where every bullet landed.”⁸
Yet live fire has struck medical teams and ambulances.⁹
Snipers have shot elderly women and children.¹⁰ It is
hard to see how any of these participants threatened the
integrity of the Israeli state. The fact that the IDF maintains, despite much criticism, that they were confirmed
threats is all the more troubling.
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The Earth is squeezing us.
I wish we were its wheat
So we could die and live again.¹

OVER THE PAST TWO AND A HALF MONTHS, a narrow sliver of
land in the eastern Mediterranean has transformed into
a site of commemoration, resistance, and violence. Since
March 30, Gazans have marched to the eastern edge of
their territory—to an area no greater than eight-hundred
meters in width, extending along the twenty-five-mile
length of the Gaza Strip—to join the largest mass demonstration in Gaza since the late 1980s. Over ten thousand
have participated in each of the weekly Friday protests;
on May 14th, at the height of demonstrations, there were
nearly forty-thousand Gazans in attendance. The protests
coincide with the seventieth-anniversary of the Palestinian
nakba, the expulsion of over seven-hundred thousand
Palestinians from their land and homes in 1948. The rallies
are an expression of defiance against what Palestinians
call al-nakba al-mustamerra—the ongoing catastrophe—
particularly in Gaza, where multiple wars, a crippling siege,
failing infrastructure, and political infighting have pushed
nearly two million Palestinians closer and closer to the
brink of societal collapse. And these past two months have
themselves marked yet another chapter in the history of
Palestinian catastrophe. Israeli soldiers have killed over
one hundred twenty Palestinian civilians and wounded over
thirteen thousand with live sniper ammunition, rubber
bullets, and tear gas canisters.² The majority of those lucky
enough to survive the impact of bullets will, accoring to
the local health ministry, be left with lifelong disabilities.³
What has been nearly as troubling, though, is the extent
to which these basic facts have been distorted to justify
the use of deadly force. The Israeli government has claimed
that the Islamist fundamentalist organization, Hamas,
is behind the protests, using demonstrators as human
shields and attempting to breach the Israeli fence.⁴ Israeli
officials have similarly maintained that their soldiers are
acting in self-defense—or, conversely, that the Palestinians
who throw stones and makeshift explosive devices, burn

It is not only Israel, though, that has portrayed Palestinian
protestors as a legitimate threat. The US government has
justified the use of lethal force against demonstrators
based on Israel’s right to “self-defense,” the same excuse
used to justify Israeli strikes on Iranian targets in Syria.
The New York Times, too, has repeatedly misrepresented
the protests, which it described as “armed clashes along
the border.”¹¹ In the same sentence, the Times referred to
both Palestinian protestors and the Iranian government
as “threats” to Israel, collapsing the distinction between
stones and nuclear weapons.¹²
There may be a number of reasons why this narrative—
that Gazans are violent and thus responsible for their own
deaths—continues to carry weight. The influence of the
Israel lobby on American politics and media coverage may
certainly be one of them. But one of the simplest explanations might also be one of the best: the Israeli government has not only twisted the facts, but has helped to
prevent the truth from leaking out. Journalists on the frontlines in Gaza—those who are positioned to provide the
best coverage of the protests—have been specifically targeted by the IDF. Though they were wearing helmets and
bulletproof jackets, marked with “PRESS” in bold letters,
at least twenty-two Palestinian reporters were struck by
live sniper ammunition between March 30th and May
21st. Two have died from their wounds.¹³ According to the
Forum of Palestinian Journalists, the total number of
journalists injured at the protests has passed 175.¹⁴ The
Israeli parliament has been considering legislation that
would ban journalists from photographing on-duty IDF
soldiers, where violations would be punishable with up
to ten years in prison.¹⁵ The less the outside world knows
about the protests in Gaza, the Israeli government seems
to believe, the better.

IT IS REGRETTABLY FITTING THAT on the anniversary of the
Palestinian nakba, the narrative of the protests in Gaza
is distorted and silenced. Over the past seventy years,
history itself—its use, abuse, and erasure—has played an
important role in helping to prolong the nakba. Indeed,
part of the original catastrophe was the destruction and
scattering of vast amounts of Palestinian history. As the
historian Rashid Khalidi points out, between 1947 and

1949, “more than half of the Arab population of Palestine
fled or were driven from their homes…while the two cities
in Palestine with the largest Arab populations, Jaffa and
Haifa, were ethnically cleansed of most Arabs.”¹⁶ This
forced removal meant that the majority of privately-held
historical documents were lost or destroyed in the years
following the nakba. As a result, there is a dire shortage
of printed material to document the history of pre-1948
Palestine. Even with the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state, any central archive would necessarily
be a fragmentary collection.
Not all of the documents in question are exactly lost, however. Much of the historical material from private Palestinian collections that survived 1948 was collected and
kept classified in the Israeli State Archives. Until the
1980s—when the public was granted access to this material, inaugurating a new era of Israeli revisionist history—
there could be no challenge to the Israeli nationalist myths
that pervaded the historiography and misrepresented
both the nakba and the subsequent years of military rule.
Even today, the nakba is largely absent from public discourse in Israel, and the state maintains the authority to
punish those who commemorate it.¹⁷
The impact of these restrictions, though, is not limited
to historians. As the Palestinian-American journalist
Ramzy Baroud argues, part of the trauma of the ongoing
nakba for Palestinians is the continued suppression of
their own history. In a recent op-ed for The Independent,
Baroud recalls a particularly vivid memory from his early
life in a Gaza refugee camp. During the First Intifada,
Israeli soldiers entered the camp and killed four youth,
including one of Baroud’s close childhood friends. But what
struck him most severely was the silence in the wake of
these deaths. “Once the young men were buried,” Baroud
remembers, “my father fiddled hopelessly with the radio,
trying to find any news broadcast, anywhere, that reported

in the way of historical analysis or explicit argumentation.
Rather, it is the logical extension of Baroud’s work as a
journalist. His goal is to allow Palestinians to speak for
themselves, to narrate their own histories, and in so doing,
to show “ordinary people as active agents in shaping the
present and future.”¹⁹ The Last Earth, then, is a testament
to the importance of oral tradition: although physical
records have been lost, Palestinian history will endure as
long as there are those to remember and retell it.
Along with a team of fellow researchers and journalists,
Baroud spent the past three years reaching out to Palestinians across the world through social media and other
online platforms, sorting through hundreds of potential
candidates, and interviewing a final fifty to gather the
stories presented in this book. The final product reflects
this diversity of time and place: in nine chapters, we
move between Gaza and Australia, Jenin and Syria, alMujaydil and Lebanon; from the Great Revolt of 1936 to
Black September in 1970, from the nakba of 1948 to the
Second Intifada in 2002, and from the naksa of 1967 to
the Syrian war in 2015.
It might seem that such a wide scope would belie Baroud’s
larger aim in The Last Earth—to provide “a unified perspective on Palestinian identity in modern times.” Yet Baroud
manages to weave these seemingly disparate stories into
a distinct narrative. Despite everything that serves to
divide Palestinians from each other—walls, fences, borders, political factionalism and military force, exile and
diaspora—Baroud shows that their individual histories are
linked by a common root and a multitude of shared experiences. All of the Palestinians in The Last Earth carry
the nakba of 1948 with them, through memories of lost
villages, the stories of parents and grandparents, or even
a family memento—a key, for example, to a house that
has long been destroyed. But this is not merely an historical awareness: they all remain affected by that original

AS LONG AS THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT
DISTORTS THE NARRATIVE OF THE PROTESTS,
SILENCES PALESTINIAN JOURNALISTS,
AND FORBIDS PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF
PALESTINIAN HISTORY, SIMPLY GIVING
PALESTINIANS A PLATFORM TO RETELL
THEIR OWN HISTORIES IS A NECESSARILY
POLITICAL ACT.
on the terrible events that took place in our camp on that catastrophe. Even for those in the diaspora, as illustrated
day. No one did.”¹⁸ This was the same silence that accom- by the stories in The Last Earth, the mere fact of being
panied the destruction of his grandfather’s village, Beit
Palestinian can be a burden. It is the Palestinian schoolDaras, in 1948. And, Baroud soon realized, this was a
child who, when invited to share the story of her family’s
silence familiar to Palestinians everywhere, whose stories
emigration to Australia, is informed by her teacher that
had been ignored or twisted, and ultimately expunged
“there [is] no such thing as Palestine.” It is the Palestinian
from the historical record.
refugee in Syria who, while fleeing his country for Turkey,
learns to deny his identity because Palestinians are
Baroud, the editor of the Palestine Chronicle, a former
“thrown in Turkish jails for significantly longer durations
managing editor at the Middle East Eye and Al Jazeera
than their Syrian counterparts.” It is the granddaughter of
Online, and a frequent contributor to a host of Englisha Palestinian who carries with her a “nagging sadness”—a
language publications, describes his work as an author
guilt for being able to “forget [her] people’s suffering.”
and a journalist as giving voice to those Palestinians who
have been “deliberately muted.” His fourth and latest book— For those living in Gaza and the West Bank, however, the
The Last Earth: A Palestinian Story—is a worthy addition
ongoing nakba manifests itself on a daily basis. Here, to
to this project. The Last Earth is, as Baroud calls it, a
be Palestinian is to be persecuted not only by Israel and
“people’s history,” an account of the nakba and its afterits Western allies, but even by the Palestinian Authority,
math told from the perspective of those who experienced whose security forces serve as “a line of defense for the
it. This is not a conventional work of history: there is little
Israeli army,” enter the homes of Palestinians, and “[demand]
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confessions and [levy] threats.” To be Palestinian is to
his daughter, she should pass on his story to her siblings
live under military occupation—particularly for those who and children—the story of a Palestinian Bedouin, “born in
have known nothing else. The younger Palestinians in
a world that had no place for poor people or wanderers.”
The Last Earth grow up under the constant watch of the
Israeli military establishment, and their attitudes towards Ali’s story illustrates the larger point that in The Last
Israel are shaped by their interactions with soldiers. Hana Earth, Palestinian history is confined to family history.
Shalabi, the infamous Palestinian hunger striker, would
The younger generations learn the history of the nakba
often “hear of ‘the Jews’ [as a young girl] but would hardly through the stories of their parents and grandparents.
ever see them.” Her decision to support the First Intifada, Baroud succeeds not merely by capturing these in print,
then, is not a result of a deep-seated hatred of Jews, but
but by elevating family history as a genre of historical
rather a reaction to the murder of a neighbor by Israeli
narrative. These stories often convey Palestinian history
soldiers, “ugly, cruel men who spoke a strange language
as well as, if not better than, the traditional academic
and wore military uniforms.”
accounts. A number of historians, for example, have written extensively about the phenomenon of Palestinian land
To be Palestinian, as exemplified by Shalabi, is also to
loss during the 1930s and the subsequent urbanization of
be part of a long tradition of resistance. Baroud, however, the Palestinian peasantry. But to hear the stories of these
steers clear of glorifying his subjects: the Palestinians in fellahin (tillers, farmers) from their sons and daughters—
The Last Earth resist desperately, driven by the need to
to learn of their struggle to “fend off the constant attempts
regain a sense of agency. Baroud captures the humiliation
of the large clans to deprive [them] of [their] land and strip
and despair that push those living under military occupa- [them] of what was rightfully [theirs]”—is to grasp this
tion, particularly young men, towards violence. But he
history as a lived experience. So too might we read schodoes so without endorsing it—if anything, he emphasizes
larly accounts of Jamal Abdel Nasser’s rise to power in
its consequences. It is Shalabi’s brother, Samir, who deEgypt and appreciate its importance in the context of
cides to place a bomb in the middle of a street to ambush
Palestinian liberation struggle. But it is more meaningful,
an Israeli military convoy, and who is later killed by Israeli and perhaps more memorable, to meet those Palestinian
soldiers while attempting to carry out a suicide attack.
refugees who placed such hopes in this Egyptian leader
But it is Shalabi who bears the punishment for her broth- that they named their sons Jamal in his honor.
er’s actions: suspected of planning to avenge Samir’s
death, she is kept in administrative detention for twenty- These family histories also help us understand the nakba
five months, and subjected to physical violence, sexual
as a constantly unfolding catastrophe: The Last Earth is
abuse, and psychological torture. When she is arrested
a tragedy in multiple acts, seen through the eyes of three
for the second time, just months after being released,
generations of Palestinians. This is, too, where Baroud
and assaulted with even greater brutality, she begins her
makes his largest historiographical contribution. Although
hunger strike:
he is not the first to record Palestinian stories, most historians and anthropologists have either focused exclu[A]s Hana grew physically weaker, her resolve grew
sively on gathering oral histories from the pre-1948 period
stronger. Her gums swelled by day twenty. Her hair fell
or have restricted themselves to a specific historical event
out by day thirty-five. And only when blood began to
or topic in the post-1948 era.²² In The Last Earth, however,
pour from her nose was she taken to a Haifa hospital…
by zooming in on a single family unit, it becomes clear
[it was] a sign that her death was imminent.
how al-nakba al-mustamera extends across time—not, as
we might assume, in a linear fashion. To take the Lubani
Shalabi’s story is certainly a testament to the human capa- family as an example: in the first generation, there is
city for nonviolent resistance. But it also suggests that
Mohammed, a “well-regarded government employee”
under certain conditions of oppression, a desire for jusfrom a small Palestinian village. In 1948, when his village
tice can override our most basic instincts for survival. Here, is destroyed, he escapes with family to a refugee camp
there is no difference between life and death—they are, as near Damascus, where he is reduced to shoveling cow
a protestor in Gaza recently affirmed, the “same thing.”²⁰ dung for a living. Despite the upheaval of his childhood,
Mohammed’s son, Jamal, manages to gain a respected
AS LONG AS THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT distorts the narraposition as a teacher in an UNRWA school. Yet they are
tive of the protests, silences Palestinian journalists, and
still Palestinian refugees, living in a country where their
forbids public discussion of Palestinian history, simply
security and stability is necessarily tenuous. So when
giving Palestinians a platform to retell their own histotheir camp is besieged by Syrian government forces,
ries is a necessarily political act. It is to demonstrate, as Jamal’s son is forced to flee his home, following in his
Baroud has recently argued, that Palestinians are capagrandfather’s footsteps. These “echoes of history,” as
ble of “making decisions independent from Palestinian
Baroud puts it, affirm the reality of nakba for Palestinians
factions.”²¹ The fact, too, that Baroud relies on oral
today, who may be affected by it as directly and as territradition is welcome: even Israel’s most important revibly as their grandparents. They suggest that the adversity
sionist historians have largely restricted themselves to
Palestinians have faced and continue to face is, in fact,
Israeli sources, ignoring the potential of oral testimony.
linked to that first catastrophe. These historical links, in
But Baroud’s deeper contribution is to show that despite
turn, help us understand the ways in which the commemthe lack of recorded Palestinian history—or, perhaps,
oration of the seventieth anniversary of 1948 is simultabecause of its absence—Palestinians are committed to
neously a protest against current injustice.
documenting it themselves.
In The Last Earth, we learn of Salim, a young Palestinian
living in Gaza during the Suez War, who is compelled
IT MIGHT SEEM ODD, given Baroud’s focus on the nakba and
to follow the Israeli Army in “their every move” and
Palestinian identity, that The Last Earth begins outside
write “in his journal everything he saw and heard.” Salim
Palestine—in a refugee camp in Syria, present day, with
understands the importance of physical documentathe story of a third-generation Palestinian. Though he
tion: it does not matter whether he can make sense
identifies as Palestinian, Khaled is born in Yarmouk and
of the events he witnesses on his own, so long as he
has known nothing else. For him, Palestine only exists
can set everything down in ink. There is also Kamal, a
“in books, or as the tattered map in his family’s living
Palestinian youth detained in an Israeli military prison
room, and in old fables conveyed by long-dead grandparduring the First Intifada. Because he recognizes the
ents.” Amidst the violence of the Syrian crisis, Khaled
fragility of his own story, Kamal carves the names of his
escapes from Yarmouk. But unlike his grandfather’s exfamily members into the cell walls, setting in stone “all
pulsion, nearly seventy years before, Khaled’s exile is not
that was certain [to him].” And there is Ali, a father in
an exclusively Palestinian catastrophe. As he makes his
search of his daughter, lost amidst the chaos of the ongo- way towards western Europe, Khaled is accompanied by
ing war in Syria. With Baroud’s help, Ali tries to reach
refugees from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia, all
his daughter through the Red Cross, writing a series of
of whom are fleeing war and desolation, and who carry
letters that will most likely never reach their intended
on with a dogged persistence despite the many obstacles.
recipient. If he dies before he reaches her, Ali instructs
Perhaps, then, Baroud wants us to see the Palestinian

story as a universal one—a story shared by the millions of
refugees and exiles that wander the earth. If we are moved
by these stories of hardship, Baroud seems to suggest,
then Palestinians cannot be excluded from our sympathy. And if we agree that all people deserve a permanent
home—a “last earth”—then we cannot fail to extend this
right to Palestinians.
But if The Last Earth begins by universalizing the Palestinian struggle, then the end reminds us that the nakba
occupies a distinct place in the human narrative of exile
and loss. “The Last Sky”, the eighth chapter of the book,
is the story of Leila, also a third-generation Palestinian.
Yet Leila’s family has seemingly managed to escape the
legacy of 1948. Born in Saudi Arabia, she spends her
childhood in Jordan, where her Western-educated parents
operate a successful business. Palestine is peripheral to
her existence: “there did not seem to be a need to mention their refugee status, or include Palestine into everyday discussions…the Nakba was rarely invoked at the
dinner table or at family gatherings.”
When the Syrian crisis erupts in 2015, Leila is moved by
the images of refugees crowding into small boats, desperately seeking an escape from their war-ravaged homes.
Armed with a medical degree and a doctorate in psychology, she travels to an island in Mediterranean to volunteer at a refugee center, assigned to help “dejected refugees negotiate their pain and cope with their traumas.”
But when she arrives, she is informed that there are no
Syrians present. Here, there are only Palestinian refugees: men, women, and children who have fled camps in
Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon, and are now stranded in the
middle of the sea. Though Leila was motivated by a basic
human desire—an urge to help end suffering—her journey
brought her back to Palestine. On average, she remembers,
refugees live in exile for seventeen years; yet for these
Palestinians, “exile did not have a time limit.” If, Leila
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THE PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE, THEN THE END
REMINDS US THAT THE NAKBA OCCUPIES A
DISTINCT PLACE IN THE HUMAN NARRATIVE
OF EXILE AND LOSS.
wonders, we hope that Syrians might someday return to
Syria, then for these refugees, “why not to Palestine? Why
never Palestine?”
Leila’s story reminds us that the deeper we are willing to
look, the more we realize that our contemporary crises are
inextricably connected to the nakba, in both its past and
present forms. We should care about Palestine because
we believe that all people are deserving of certain universal rights: the right to return to one’s homeland, to be
equal under the law, to be secure on one’s own property,
to protest without risking death. But we cannot ignore the
fact that the nakba is exceptional in its scope—that this
seventy-year saga is, in its historical specificity, particularly tragic. As the late Edward Said argued nearly twenty
years ago, any permanent resolution to the nakba cannot
require Palestinians to “forget and renounce [their] history of loss, dispossessed by the very people who taught
everyone the importance of not forgetting the past.”²³ The
stories collected in The Last Earth serve as evidence of
this history of loss and resistance, a history that continues to unfold today. But they also stand as a testament
to the power of history itself, of the need to recount the
past, as part of that struggle. They remind us that yes,
this nakba must end; but so too must it be remembered.
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